Innovation Outside Firm Boundaries: A Real Options Perspective on Appropriability, Commercialization Strategies and Firm Performance by Rousseau, Mary Beth
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School
5-2013
Innovation Outside Firm Boundaries: A Real
Options Perspective on Appropriability,
Commercialization Strategies and Firm
Performance
Mary Beth Rousseau
mroussea@utk.edu
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more
information, please contact trace@utk.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rousseau, Mary Beth, "Innovation Outside Firm Boundaries: A Real Options Perspective on Appropriability, Commercialization
Strategies and Firm Performance. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2013.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/1775
To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Mary Beth Rousseau entitled "Innovation Outside
Firm Boundaries: A Real Options Perspective on Appropriability, Commercialization Strategies and
Firm Performance." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content
and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, with a major in Business Administration.
Franz W. Kellermanns, Major Professor
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:
Annette L. Ranft, David W. Williams, Stephanie A. Bohon
Accepted for the Council:
Dixie L. Thompson
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
  
 
Innovation Outside Firm Boundaries: A Real Options Perspective on Appropriability, 
Commercialization Strategies and Firm Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented for 
the Doctor of Philosophy  
Degree 
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mary Beth Rousseau 
May 2013 
 
ii 
 
Dedication 
This work is dedicated to my loving and supportive husband Joseph; my precious daughters 
Catherine and Linette; and my mother and father who always believed I could. 
  
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
Thank you to my family whose love, support and accomplishments of their own made it possible 
for me to start and finish this journey.  Thank you to my friend, colleague and dissertation 
advisor, Franz W. Kellermanns for your patience, kindness and trust, and reminding me that the 
best dissertation is a done dissertation.  Thank you to my dissertation committee; Annette L. 
Ranft for wisdom and mentorship during my dissertation and transition to an academic career, 
David W. Williams for thoughtful review and healthy debate that improved the quality of my 
research, and Stephanie A. Bohon for sharing your vast statistical expertise with me and so many 
others from the College of Business.  
There are many other faculty who set me in the right direction and kept me going. Anne Smith, 
Russell Crook, Dave Woehr, Dennis Duchon and Donde Plowman, thank you for understanding 
that we all start from the beginning.  I also want to recognize my friend and cohort Laura 
Madden and her husband Tim who added so many dimensions of social support and compassion 
it makes me think we need an expanded definition of the constructs. 
  
iv 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation focuses on the conditions under which innovating firms may employ external 
commercialization strategies to appropriate value from their innovations and enhance firm 
performance.  Specifically, I examine the relationship between appropriability conditions of 
intellectual property protection, complementary assets and uncertainty, and the firm’s decision to 
commercialize innovations externally.  Applying real options theory to a firm’s innovation 
strategy, I hypothesize that external commercialization strategies mediate the effect of 
appropriability conditions on firm performance.  Hypotheses tests are conducted on a sample of 
more than 1600 firms and 300 external commercialization agreements in the manufacturing 
sector.  Notwithstanding the overall lack of support for these hypotheses, there remains potential 
for making a contribution to the innovation literature.  First, the integration of real options theory 
and the appropriability framework offers a theoretical extension of both literatures.  Second, 
results of post-hoc tests indicate that some relationships do exist and further investigation is 
warranted. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  
Introduction 
Firms in the US spent $330 billion on innovation in 2008 (NSF, 2010), with each firm 
aiming to benefit from their investment. Indeed, strategic management literature points to 
innovation as a source of competitive advantage and one explanation for why some firms 
outperform others (Hamel, 2000; D’Aveni, Dagnino & Smith, 2010). Overall support for the link 
between firm innovation and performance contributes to the view that firms will benefit from 
investing in innovation (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010; Rosenbusch, Brinckmann & Bausch, 2011). 
However, innovating firms do not always realize the value generated by investing in innovation 
(Arrow, 1962; Schumpeter, 1950). Some of the value generated by investing in innovation may 
be absorbed by other firms including imitators, suppliers, customers or even partners (Teece, 
1986). Thus, it appears that it is not sufficient for firms simply to invest in innovation. To realize 
performance advantages, it is also necessary for innovating firms to appropriate the value 
generated by this investment (Winter, 2006).  
Open innovation has been proposed as one strategy firms can use to increase 
appropriation from their investment in innovation (Chesbrough, 2003; Pisano & Teece, 2007). 
Open innovation capitalizes on the view of innovation as commercialized invention 
(Schumpeter, 1934). It recognizes that invention and commercialization are not only separate 
functions of innovation but can be performed by different firms (Teece, 1986). Open innovation 
is defined as “the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal 
innovation, and expand the markets for external use of innovation” (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke 
& West, 2006: p. 1).1 Thus, firms stand to gain from both searching for external sources of 
                                                 
1
 Although the terms are similar, open source software and other types of open systems are different than open 
innovation and lie outside the scope of this dissertation. Open source software (OSS) is continuously re-invented by 
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technology and intellectual property that can be brought inside the firm to be developed and 
actively searching for external channels to market for technology and intellectual property that 
was developed inside the firm but may appropriate additional value if commercialized outside 
the firm (Rothaermel & Alexandre, 2009; Jacobides, Knudsen & Augier, 2006). It is the latter 
strategy, to appropriate value from external commercialization of innovation, which is of primary 
interest in this dissertation.  
I define external commercialization as an organization’s deliberate commercialization of 
technological knowledge to an outside organization, exclusively or in conjunction with internal 
commercialization (Chesbrough, 2003; Lichtenthaler, 2005; 2009).  That is, external and internal 
commercialization strategies are not mutually exclusive for any one innovation or across the 
firm’s innovation portfolio.  Mechanisms for external commercialization include but are not 
limited to outlicensing, spin outs and patent sales (Chesbrough, 2003). Economic estimates place 
firm revenue from industrial technology licensing at more than $60 billion in the United States 
and $100 billion worldwide (Arora & Gambardella, 2010a; Robbins, 2009).  
Exemplars of the external commercialization strategy include firms such as Texas 
Instruments which earns up to half its net income from licensing revenues in some years 
(Chesbrough & Garman, 2009). Similarly, Qualcomm opted for a business model of licensing its 
technology to device makers rather than manufacturing handsets in competition with them 
(Pisano & Teece, 2007). IBM and Dow Chemical have undertaken aggressive programs to 
monetize their rich patent stocks through outlicensing. IBM collects as much as $1billion, over 
15% of its R&D expenditure, in licensing revenue annually (Chesbrough & Garman, 2009). 
                                                                                                                                                             
a developer community that has full access to the source code. As a condition of use, the developers must make their 
enhancements to the source code freely available to others in the community (The Open Source Initiative). This 
open source model promotes widespread value creation and knowledge transfer among the community of interest, 
while effectively precluding value capture by any one member of the community (Alexy & Reitzig, 2012; 
Vitharana, King & Chapman, 2010).  
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Xerox is an example of a firm that struggled to commercialize technologies developed in its 
PARC research center and eventually adopted a spin out strategy to commercialize its 
technologies. Adobe, 3Com and SynOptics are examples of successful companies spun out of 
Xerox technology (Rosenbloom & Chesbrough, 2002). Likewise, Lucent and British Telecom 
have leveraged their technology with a spin out strategy (Chesbrough & Garman, 2009). 
External commercialization strategies are also used by smaller firms. Studies of firms in the 
biopharmaceutical industry confirm that external commercialization through licensing can be a 
viable strategy for firms that do not vertically integrate into manufacturing and marketing 
(Kollmer & Dowling, 1994; Walter, 2012).  
Research Questions 
The literature investigating firm motivations for external commercialization focuses 
largely on the influence of intellectual property protection on a firm’s propensity to license its 
technology (Arora, Fosfuri & Gambardella, 2004). Mixed empirical results, combined with 
insights from the seminal work of Teece (1986), laid the groundwork for researchers to 
investigate additional conditions that would affect a firm’s ability to appropriate value from 
innovation. Teece (1986) proposed that together with intellectual property protection, a firm’s 
control over complementary assets and uncertainty related to market demand and technological 
trajectories influenced whether a firm was likely to appropriate value from its innovation. 
Subsequent research has investigated the influence of these appropriability conditions on the 
firms licensing activity (e.g. Arora & Fosfuri, 2003; Ceccagnoli, 2009; Fosfuri, 2006). Yet, these 
studies do not link external commercialization with firm performance.  
Given the important contribution of the appropriability framework (c.f. Research Policy 
2006 special issue) and the body of literature investigating firm licensing behavior (c.f. Arora & 
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Gambardella, 2010a for a review), it is surprising that no study has yet conducted an empirical 
investigation of the performance outcomes of external commercialization in the context of the 
appropriability framework. In the only study that I am aware of that links external 
commercialization to firm performance, the influence of the appropriability conditions were not 
investigated (Walter, 2012). Moreover, extensions of the appropriability framework propose that 
firms may deploy external commercialization to strategically reposition themselves with respect 
to appropriability conditions and thus improve their performance outcomes (Jacobides et al., 
2006; Pisano & Teece, 2007). However, the empirical work to support this proposition has not 
yet been undertaken. 
At the same time external commercialization appears to be underutilized in practice 
(Chesbrough, 2003; Pisano & Teece, 2007). Despite the anecdotal evidence and billions of 
dollars in licensing revenue already collected by firms, a closer examination reveals that a 
limited number of firms account for the majority of external commercialization activity and 
much of it occurs between affiliated companies (Arora & Gambardella, 2010b; Robbins, 2009). 
Although proponents of external commercialization provide a convincing argument for more 
firms to adopt this strategy, empirical evidence to identify the conditions under which an external 
commercialization decision results in superior firm performance is currently absent. 
This opportunity to increase our understanding of external commercialization as a 
strategy to enhance appropriation from innovation and firm performance led me to investigate 
two research questions: 
1. What conditions influence the extent to which a firm engages in external 
commercialization?  
2. Does external commercialization influence firm performance?  
5 
 
Another challenge that has stymied progress in the literature is a theoretical foundation 
for external commercialization as a strategy to enhance competitiveness and firm performance 
(Arora & Gambardella, 2010a; Chesbrough et al., 2006). Research investigating external 
commercialization (specifically outlicensing) adopts a transaction cost economics perspective to 
explain why technology is commercialized inside or outside the firm (Williamson, 1991). 
Although this provides insights on the boundaries of the firm, it does not contribute to 
explanations of why some firms outperform others and thus has limited value in guiding firm 
strategy.  
Theoretical Framework 
Accordingly, I draw on real options theory to explain both the external commercialization 
decision and its effect on firm performance. The commercialization decision, like other decisions 
in the innovation process, is characterized by relatively high technical and market uncertainty 
(McGrath, 1997). Real options theory has been applied to previous innovation research to 
because it is a useful approach to decision making under uncertainty (McGrath, 1997; McGrath, 
Ferrier & Mendelow, 2004). Real options involve investments in real assets which create the 
right, but not the obligation, to take an action in the future (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999). For 
example an investment in research and development creates an underlying asset in technological 
knowledge. This provides the firm with an option to further invest commercialization of the 
innovation (Bowman & Hurry, 1993). Thus, I apply real options theory to commercialization of 
innovation; conceptualizing external commercialization as a real option on the investment in 
innovation. 
Although real options theory provides a general theoretical approach to decision making 
under uncertainty, more specific criteria are required to apply real options theory as a useful 
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heuristic for discrete decisions - such as the commercialization of innovation. Building on the 
foundations in the literature, I draw on the appropriability framework (Teece, 1986) to supply 
these criteria. Teece (1986) seminal article, commonly referred to as Profiting from Innovation 
introduced the appropriability framework to identify conditions under which an innovating firm 
could appropriate value from its own innovation. The framework proposed that a firm would 
capture the value of an innovation based on; 1) its control over complementary assets (specific or 
generic), 2) appropriability regimes (the extent of IP protection), and 3) market timing (technical 
and market uncertainty). Through applying real options theory and the appropriability framework 
to the investigation of external commercialization and firm performance I aim to make the 
following contributions.  
Contributions 
The principal contribution of this research is to extend the literature on external 
commercialization to include the effects on firm performance. This contribution is enhanced by 
integrating the appropriability framework to provide the context for the investigation. The extant 
literature often studies external commercialization in the context of the appropriability 
framework, but we do not know the effects on firm performance under these conditions. The 
only study to date examining external commercialization and firm performance does not account 
for appropriability conditions (Walter, 2012).  
The contribution is further augmented by the large scale empirical design of the study. I 
investigate more than 300 external commercialization agreements across 1600 firms from 
multiple industries in the manufacturing sector. This design is meant to achieve generalizability 
beyond single industry studies (Fosfuri, 2006) or samples that include only firms that engage in 
external commercialization (Walter, 2012). 
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A second contribution arises from the application of real options theory to external 
commercialization strategy. Extension of real options theory from innovation in general to 
external commercialization in particular, provides a strategic focus to the study of external 
commercialization (McGrath, 1997). Real options theory goes beyond the transactions cost 
explanation of the boundaries of the firm to provide a performance based rationale for external 
commercialization. In addition, real options theory has been previously recommended as a 
relevant theoretical lens for viewing external commercialization strategies (Pisano & Teece, 
2007). However this has not been systematically applied in the literature to date.  
This dissertation also aims to inform practitioners on several fronts. Foremost, it has 
potential to provide empirical evidence to support recommendations for firms to use an external 
commercialization strategy. In the absence of a link between external commercialization and 
firm performance, this evidence does not currently exist. It also provides real options logic to 
show that commercialization decisions may be improved when external commercialization is 
included in the heuristics. These contributions may help practitioners garner support for external 
commercialization in their organization.  
In summary, I have provided an overview of the challenges firms face in appropriating 
value from their investment in innovation. I further identified external commercialization as a 
potential strategy to enhance appropriation from innovation and firm performance, and pointed 
to the absence of empirical evidence for this proposition. Finally, I identified the contributions 
that could be made through investigation of the focal research questions in this dissertation. To 
conclude Chapter 1, I offer definitions and terms and outline the organization of the dissertation. 
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Definitions and Terms 
Appropriation, appropriability and appropriability regime. In the context of this 
paper appropriation refers to the distribution of value generated from the innovation among the 
innovating firm and other entities (Ceccagnoli, 2009; Teece, 1986; Winter, 2006). These entities 
include but are not limited to rival firms, new entrants, suppliers or customers (Pisano & Teece, 
2007). This is consistent with the industrial economics approach to quasi-rent distribution at the 
industry level (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Porter, 1980). In contrast, the appropriation construct 
in resource based theory (RBT) is often firm-level rather than industry level. The RBT literature 
examines how value captured by the firm is distributed among firm stakeholders such as 
employees and shareholders according to relative bargaining power (Coff 1999; 2010). In this 
paper I refer to the value appropriated by the innovating firm relative to other firms (Amit & 
Schoemaker, 1993; Porter, 1980), rather than to value appropriated by stakeholders relative to 
the firm (Coff 1999, 2010).  
The term appropriability refers to the extent to which the entity that generated the value 
can capture it. For example, the appropriability framework (Teece, 1986) establishes the 
conditions that influence the degree to which the innovating firm can capture the value created 
from innovation, relative to other entities (Ceccagnoli, 2009; Teece, 1986; Winter, 2006).  
Appropriability regime is a specific means of appropriability and refers precisely to “the 
protection afforded the innovator by intellectual property protection and natural barriers to 
imitation” (Pisano & Teece, 2007: p. 279).  As the name implies, the appropriability regime 
influences which entities ultimately capture significant shares of the available profits from 
innovation (Nelson, 2006; Teece, 2006). A strong appropriability regime offers relatively high 
protection for innovators and facilitates value capture by the innovating firm. A weak 
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appropriability regime affords relatively low protection for innovators and enables value capture 
by other firms in the industry (Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, 2000). 
External commercialization. I define external commercialization as an organization’s 
deliberate commercialization of technological knowledge to an outside organization, exclusively 
or in conjunction with internal commercialization. The definition is built from several terms 
defined in previous literature. The first term, outward open innovation, originates in 
Chesbrough’s (2003) discussion of open innovation and refers to “internal ideas [that] can also 
be taken to market through external channels, outside the current businesses of the firm, to 
generate additional value” (2003: p. xxiv). A related term, outbound open innovation, has been 
defined as “[external] commercialization of technological knowledge exclusively or in addition 
to its internal application” (Lichtenthaler, 2009: p. 318). The last term, external knowledge 
commercialization, is described as “an organization’s deliberate commercializing of knowledge 
assets to another independent organization involving a contractual obligation for compensation 
in monetary or non-monetary terms” (Lichtenthaler, 2005: p. 233). By consolidating the 
definition of the focal construct from prior terms and definitions, I build cohesion around the 
construct and meaning of external commercialization.  
Open innovation. Open innovation is defined as “the use of purposive inflows and 
outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets for external use 
of innovation” (Chesbrough, 2006: p. 10).2 Technology transfer out of research institutions into 
the for-profit sector could be considered a specific type of open innovation (Mowery, 2011; 
Sampat, 2006). However, these special cases are not the focus of this research. In this study, I 
                                                 
2
 Similar to open source software, the philosophy of open science is to publish new discoveries so that the scientific 
community can access them freely to further advance knowledge. It is possible to conceive of open source and other 
open systems as a specific type of open innovation that includes value creation but not value capture (West, 2006). 
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consider open innovation among profit seeking firms whose usual business includes invention 
and commercialization of technological knowledge. 
Real option. Real options involve investments in real assets which create “the right, but 
not the obligation, to take an action in the future” (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999: p. 5).  
Organization 
This dissertation is organized in five chapters. This chapter introduced the purpose of the 
study and laid the foundation for investigation of external commercialization through the lenses 
of real options theory and the appropriability framework. Chapter 2 is divided into three sections. 
The first section provides a literature review of real options theory and introduces the 
appropriability framework. The second section of Chapter 2 applies real options theory to 
develop a model which explains the factors that influence external commercialization and the 
consequences for firm performance. The final section of Chapter 2 elucidates four testable 
hypotheses for this model. Chapter 3 outlines the research method including the sample, 
measures, and statistical tests of the hypotheses. Chapter 4 reports the results of the analysis. 
Finally, Chapter 5 offers a discussion of the salient results, contributions, limitations and future 
research opportunities. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
The first section of this chapter provides a literature review of real options theory. Then 
real options theory is applied to the focal construct - external commercialization of innovation. 
Next, the appropriability framework is introduced to develop a model of external 
commercialization based on real options theory. Finally, the hypotheses explicate the 
relationships between the appropriability framework, external commercialization and firm 
performance. 
Real Options 
Real options theory extends from its origins in financial options (Black & Scholes, 1973). 
A financial option is an instrument that allows an investor to make a small investment in return 
for the right, but not the obligation, to make a subsequent investment (in the underlying security) 
in the future (Black & Scholes, 1973). The option may be held until future conditions turn 
favorable, i.e., the price of the underlying security rises above the option exercise price. At this 
point the option may be exercised for a profit. However if future conditions are unfavorable, i.e., 
the price of the security falls below the option exercise price, an investor may let the option 
expire and abandon the investment. In this scenario losses are limited to the cost of the option 
(Black & Scholes, 1973). Thus, an option has value because it allows the owner to participate in 
upside potential while limiting downside losses (Black & Scholes, 1973). This simple and 
attractive investment principle led scholars to extend options theory to investments in real assets 
(Myers, 1977; Dixit & Pindyck,1994; Trigeorgis, 1996).  
Real options involve investments in real assets such as research, development and 
commercialization of innovations (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; McGrath, 1997). Similar to financial 
options, a real option is “the right, but not the obligation, to take an action in the future” (Amram 
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& Kulatilaka, 1999: p. 5). A real option is created through an initial investment in a real asset 
that positions the firm to take advantage of an opportunity in the future (Bowman & Hurry, 
1993). There are several types of options including growth options, flexibility options, and 
nested options. I describe each of these in the next section. 
Types of Options 
Growth options. Growth options allow managers to stage investments such that smaller 
investments can be made initially with the option to increase commitment and expand the project 
as success unfolds (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999). For example, joint venture agreements that 
contain explicit provisions for buying additional equity are considered growth options (Reuer & 
Tong, 2005). Foothold investments for market entry are also considered growth options (Miller 
& Folta, 2002). Some growth options are considered platform investments, or learning 
investments. For example, basic research and development, while not providing a direct payoff 
in the exploratory research stage, creates a platform for development of future applications which 
may be exploited at a later stage with further investment (Kim & Kogut, 1996). Additional 
examples of growth options include incremental addition of manufacturing capacity, product line 
extensions and geographic expansion (Trigeorgis, 1996).  
Flexibility options. Flexibility options enable managers to deploy the investment in more 
than one way. A classic example is a power plant that can use alternative fuel sources such as 
coal, oil or natural gas. The source of fuel can be changed according to the prevailing price of 
fuel (Copeland & Antikarov, 2001). Platform investments in basic technologies, treated as a 
growth option above, may also be considered a flexibility option because basic technology, for 
example GPS, can often be applied in different product markets (Kim & Kogut, 1996). 
13 
 
Accordingly, alternatives for internal or external commercialization of innovation may be 
considered a flexibility option (Vanhaverbeke, Van de Vrande, & Chesbrough, 2008).  
Nested options. Nested options, sometimes referred to as compound or embedded 
options, emerge as a chain of options in which one investment opens additional options for future 
investments (Amram & Kulatilaka,1999). New product development processes are based on a 
series of nested options with successive decision points (gate) representing the exercise of an 
option to begin the next phase (stage) - or discontinue the project (MacMillan, van Putten, 
McGrath & Thompson, 2006). However, nested options are not always specified ex-ante. 
Knowledge investments such as those in basic research are commenced with the options for 
continuing the research emerging only as the project advances (Kogut, 1991). The option of 
external commercialization may also be considered a nested option in that it can only be 
considered subsequent to invention. 
To illustrate: research and patenting of one specialty chemical compound (platform 
investment) may yield five options for new product applications (flexibility option). Managers 
may decide to exercise the option for further product development (nested option) for two of 
these five options. At a later stage one of these options may be commercialized as a new product 
(growth option). After this product is established in core markets managers may choose to make 
further investments in product line extensions or new markets (growth options). Meanwhile 
mangers may hold the second option in the development stage foregoing commercialization at 
the present time. The third option may be licensed to another firm for application in a specific 
market (nested/flexibility option), while the remaining two options are abandoned. This example 
illustrates how the value of a real option increases as the chain of options magnifies the variance 
in outcomes on the upside while limiting the downside. Options seem particularly valuable for 
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innovation investments in which technological and market uncertainty are high, specific 
outcomes are difficult to specify ex-ante, and managerial discretion to exercise, hold, abandon or 
create new options is critical to success (Amram & Kulatilaka,1999; McGrath, 1997). 
Real options are sequential investments that can be made under conditions of uncertainty. 
In keeping with its core principle in finance, a real option has value because it enables the firm to 
capture upside potential while limiting downside losses (Lee, Peng & Barney, 2007; McGrath, 
1999; Myers, 1977). The value of a real option is built on three fundamental principles: 
irreversibility, uncertainty and managerial flexibility (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Kogut & 
Kulatilaka, 2001). Table 2.1 compares real and financial options with respect to these principles. 
Real options are characteristically less reversible and more uncertain than financial options and 
the managerial flexibility is more complex due to the nature of nested options, which are not 
available in financial options. In the next section, I review the real options literature within the 
structure of the principles of irreversibility, uncertainty and managerial flexibility. 
Irreversibility 
The first principle framing real options value is irreversibility. Unlike financial assets that 
can be readily traded in secondary markets, investments in real assets tend to be irreversible 
(Myers, 1977). Irreversibility is the extent to which the “investment expenditures are sunk costs 
… and cannot be recovered” (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994: p. 8). Because managers are reluctant to 
incur sunk costs, irreversibility leads firms to delay investment in new projects and hold onto 
existing projects longer (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001). Indeed, McGrath & Nerkar (2004) found 
that when larger commitments had been made in an existing area, firms were less likely to 
pursue new areas. This inertia may be mitigated by adopting a real options approach to managing 
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Table 2.1 Comparison of Financial Options and Real Options 
 Financial Options Real Options 
Uncertainty Financial options have a fixed 
expiration date and exercise price ex-
ante. The price of the underlying 
security and return on the option 
investment is known at the time the 
option is exercised. The uncertainty 
with respect to a financial option is 
limited to the price changes of the 
underlying security (above or below 
the exercise price), which can be 
monitored transparently with 
accuracy (Myers, 1977). 
Investments in real options do not 
have a fixed expiration date. The 
expected return on investment at the 
time the option is exercised can be 
forecasted but remains uncertain. The 
uncertainty surrounding real options 
includes dynamic and complex 
environmental factors. The impact of 
these factors on the return on 
investment over time is uncertain 
(Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999; Myers, 
1977). 
Managerial 
Discretion 
Financial options are created when an 
option on an underlying security is 
purchased. Financial options may be 
held until exercised for a profit, held 
until expiration (abandoned) or sold 
in the secondary market (Black & 
Scholes, 1973, Myers, 1977). 
Real options are created when firms 
make an initial investment in a real 
asset. Real options may be fully 
exercised by making a full 
investment and completing the 
project. Real options may also be 
exercised by making an incremental 
investment, in effect creating a 
subsequent option. Real options can 
be held for an indeterminate time 
period or abandoned with the sunk 
cost limited to the investment to date 
(Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; 
Trigeorgis,1996). 
Irreversibility 
Investments in financial options are 
reversible because they are actively 
traded in secondary markets (Black & 
Scholes, 1973). 
Investments in real options tend to be 
irreversible because there is not an 
active secondary market. These 
investments may also be firm-
specific or ambiguous making them 
idiosyncratic to the investing firm 
and trading terms difficult to 
determine. Therefore investments in 
real options are largely construed as 
sunk costs (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). 
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investments in full scale projects, firms using real options make small initial investments 
followed by a series of incremental investments prior to making a final commitment with a large 
investment. This sequencing of investments allows the firm to initiate more new projects with a 
small sunk cost in each one (Bowman & Hurry, 1993). Because the sunk costs are limited, 
managers may also be more willing accept sunk costs of unsuccessful projects, and allow funds 
to be reallocated to follow on investments in projects with greater prospects (McGrath, 1997). 
Based on the assumption of irreversibility, real options predicts that firms will start more and 
cancel more projects and make small investments sequentially (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Adner 
& Levinthal, 2004b).  
Bowman & Hurry (1993) extended these predictions to inferences for firm performance 
proposing that: 1) firms using the sequential approach to investing would outperform those that 
make single large investments or unrelated small investments, and 2) firms with larger and more 
diverse options portfolios would perform better across varying environmental conditions, than 
those with a narrower set of options (Bowman & Hurry, 1993). Hurry, Miller & Bowman (1992), 
found evidence of real options investment patterns among Japanese investors in technology 
ventures. These investors had larger portfolios, and made smaller investments followed by 
increasing stakes over time. In contrast, their American counterparts made large investments and 
quick exits; however performance was not measured in this study (Hurry, Miller & Bowman, 
1992). Folta (1998) also found that biotech firms favored investments in growth and flexibility 
options such as joint ventures over full commitments to irreversible investments in internal 
development or acquisition. However, Reuer & Leiblein (2000) found that although firms did 
exhibit a real options pattern of investment in international expansion, this did not limit 
downside risk. Contrary to hypotheses, larger multinational portfolios (measured by the number 
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of countries entered), and smaller investments (indicated by the presence of joint ventures) 
contributed to below target performance outcomes (Reuer & Leiblein, 2000). These studies 
correspond to one of the three real options foundations - irreversibility. Additional investigations 
of real options have incorporated the principles of uncertainty and managerial flexibility, which I 
review next. Table 2.2 summarizes the empirical research corresponding to these three principles 
of real options theory. 
Uncertainty 
Decision making under uncertainty is the cornerstone of real options theory (Dixit & 
Pindyck, 1994; Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999). Uncertainty is reflected in the dynamism and 
complexity of the external environment (Aldrich 1979; Dess & Beard, 1984) and the ambiguity 
and complexity of the internal task environment (Duncan, 1972; Reus, Ranft, Lamont & Adams, 
2009). In the context of innovation, the uncertainty associated with market timing, the 
combination of technical and demand uncertainty, is particularly relevant (Santos & Eisenhardt, 
2009; Teece, 1986).  
Technical uncertainty occurs in the external environment due to the array of competitors 
(complexity) vying for technical and market dominance in the industry and the pace (dynamism) 
at which it evolves (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975; Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984). Technical 
uncertainty outside the firm is resolved over time as firms acquire new information about the 
emergence of dominant technologies and competitors (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Reus et al., 2009). 
Thus external technical uncertainty incents firms to hold options while competitive dynamics are 
played out and new information is acquired (McGrath, 1997).  
In contrast, technical uncertainty inside the firm is resolved through action and further 
investment (Galbraith, 1973; Thompson, 1967). For example, investments in research and 
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development, knowledge management systems and cross-functional knowledge transfer are 
instrumental in reducing internal technical uncertainty associated with innovation (Kogut & 
Zander, 1992; Reus et al., 2009). Therefore, in contrast to external sources of technical 
uncertainty, internal technical uncertainty creates urgency for firms to act (Dixit & Pindyck, 
1994; Folta, 1998; McGrath, 1997).  
Market uncertainty is a source of external uncertainty and is comprised of demand and 
competitive uncertainty (Folta, 1998; McGrath, 1997). Demand uncertainty stems from the 
unpredictability of the size and rate of growth in new product markets (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996). Demand uncertainty creates an incentive for the firm to delay investment 
until more information emerges and uncertainty is diminished (Duncan, 1972; Reus et al., 2009). 
Yet the threat of competitive preemption poses a risk to delay (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; 
Kulatilaka & Perotti, 1998). This tension between action and deferment, that is exercising or 
holding an option, is amplified in environments of high dynamism and complexity (Duncan, 
1972; Folta & O’Brien, 2004). Thus, greater uncertainty increases the value of holding an option 
(Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001; Reuer & Tong, 2005). 
Bowman & Hurry (1993) proposed that firms which hold options in uncertain 
environments and exercise options as uncertainty is reduced will have superior growth and profit 
performance in the long term. To accomplish this, firms must be attuned to information that 
signals a change in the level of uncertainty. Opportunity arrival signals such as an increase in 
demand, adoption of a technology standard or opening of international markets signal reduced 
uncertainty and provide an impetus to take action and exercise the option. Opportunity expiration 
signals such as competitive preemption indicate the closure of an opportunity is imminent and 
the option would have little value if held beyond this point. Bowman & Hurry (1993) proposed 
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that options that are exercised in response to receiving both opportunity arrival and expiration 
signals will perform better than options exercised in response to only one signal or no 
information at all. Although empirical tests linking the holding or exercise of real options to firm 
performance are lack, several studies do provide evidence of the propensity to exercise options 
under conditions of uncertainty. 
Kogut (1991) applied real options theory to the study of joint ventures, focusing on the 
propensity for firms to acquire or divest their position in the joint venture in response to 
resolution of market uncertainty. A joint venture represents creation of a real option because it is 
an initial investment in an uncertain opportunity that frequently contains the right but not the 
obligation to increase participation in the future through acquisition of the partner’s interest. A 
joint venture also limits downside loss by sharing the investment and risk with one or more 
partners and allowing for divestment in the future (Kogut, 1991). The study found that positive 
market demand signals increased the propensity to acquire the partner’s interest in the joint 
venture, supporting the idea that opportunity arrival signals encourage exercise of the options 
(Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Kogut, 1991). However negative market demand signals had no effect 
on divestment.  Firms continued to hold options and delay further investment even in response to 
negative signals, suggesting the presence of option traps (Adner & Levinthal, 2004b; Kogut, 
1991).  
Further evidence that firms exercise options as uncertainty is reduced is provided by 
Folta & Miller (2002). This study of biotech firms found evidence to suggest that firms exercised 
options to acquire additional equity in technology partners in response to opportunity arrival 
signaled by an increase in the market value of the partner firm. Likewise, opportunity expiration 
signaled by an increased likelihood of competitive preemption triggered a similar response. 
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Table 2.2 Real Options Theory Empirical Studies 
Authors/Journal Topic/Sample Variables and Measures Major Findings 
Irreversibility 
Hurry, Miller & 
Bowman, 1992, SMJ 
Venture capital 
 
Survey of 20 Japanese and 20 
US Venture capital firms and 
corporate venturing units  
Comparison of Japanese and 
US venture capital investment 
patterns. 
IV: Frequency of categorical 
measures for size of 
investment, size of portfolio, 
time horizon, strategic 
objectives and monitoring. 
Venture capital investment behavior of Japanese 
firms fits the pattern of real options with small 
investments followed by increasing stakes over 
time, large portfolios and long term interest. 
Reuer & Leiblein, 
2000 
International joint ventures 
and subsidiary investments 
 
357 manufacturing firms, 
Compustat, CRSP and 
Directory of Corporate 
Affiliations 
DV: below target performance 
outcomes 
IV: number of countries, 
number of IJV’s 
Contrary to theory and hypotheses multinationality 
do not reduce downside risk. and IJV’s increase 
downside risk 
Uncertainty 
Kogut, 1991 Joint ventures 
 
Survey of 92 joint ventures 
DV: propensity to acquire or 
divest. 
IV: Annual venture growth 
A joint venture represents the option to expand. A 
favorable market demand signal increases the 
propensity to acquire (growth option). Negative 
signals have no effect on dissolution (option to 
delay). 
Kim & Kogut, 1996 Platform technologies and 
market entry 
 
176 semiconductor startups 
DV: Entry in a new area 
IV: market growth, prior 
experience 
Platform technologies create options on the future 
technological trajectory and market entry. Market 
entry timing coincides with growth markets in a new 
technological area. 
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Table 2.2 Continued 
Authors/Journal Topic/Sample Variables and Measures Major Findings 
McGrath & Nerkar, 
2004 
R&D investment 
 
 
31 pharmaceutical firms, 
1979-1995: Cox proportional 
hazard 
DV: Propensity to take out a 
growth option (second patent 
in a new area). 
IV: Scope of opportunity 
(number of technological 
classes and claims on the first 
patent); Cumulative 
investment (patent count); 
Effects of competition 
(number of competitors and 
patents per competitor in the 
new area). 
The propensity to invest in a growth option in a new 
area is positively related to the scope of opportunity 
in that area. 
There is a negative relationship between the 
propensity to invest in a growth option in a new area 
and the extent of commitments and cumulative 
investments in prior areas. 
There is a positive relationship between the 
propensity to invest in a growth option in a new area 
and the level of competition in that area. 
 
Reuer & Tong, 2005, 
JOM 
International joint ventures 
 
SDC database IJV’s 1995-
2002.  
2,594 IJV transactions 
DV: explicit option to acquire 
equity in an IJV  
IV: core v. non-core SIC, 
intellectual property rights in 
host country, cultural distance, 
political turmoil,  
An explicit option to acquire equity in an IJV is 
more likely under conditions of greater uncertainty. 
This is an example of a growth option.  
Tong, Reuer & Peng, 
2008 
International joint ventures 
 
293 firms, 2698 firm year 
observations 1989-2000. 
SDC, Stern Stewart, 
Compustat 
DV: growth option value 
IV: number of IJV’s, minority 
stake, core v. noncore. 
Minority IJV’s and diversifying IJV’s contribute to 
growth option value but other types do not. 
Oriani & Sobrero, 
2008 SMJ 
R&D investment 
 
290 UK manufacturing firms 
DV: market value 
of R&D investment 
IV: market uncertainty, 
technical uncertainty 
M: munificence 
Market uncertainty has a U shaped relationship with 
market value of R&D investment, matter of growth. 
Technical uncertainty has an inverted U shaped 
relationship with market value of R&D, matter of 
survival. 
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Table 2.2 Continued 
Authors/Journal Topic/Sample Variables and Measures Major Findings 
Managerial Flexibility 
Folta, 1998 Governance 
 
402 transactions in biotech 
DV: propensity to take an 
equity stake, form a JV or 
acquire. 
IV: technological distance, 
growth potential, exogenous 
technical uncertainty, threat of 
preemption 
Propensity for joint ventures and equity stakes over 
internal investment or acquisition of new 
technologies in environments of high exogenous 
technological uncertainty. 
Folta & Miller, 2002 Equity stake in technology 
partner 
DV:  Resolution of uncertainty and threat of competitive 
preemption increased the propensity to buy out the 
joint venture partner (exercise the option).  
Folta & O’Brien, 2004 Market entry 
 
Compustat 
DV: market entry 
IV: uncertainty 
M: irreversibility, value of 
growth opportunity, early 
mover advantage 
The tension between option to defer and option to 
grow in the presence of uncertainty. Nonmonotonic 
relationship. Uncertainty decreases propensity to 
enter until threshold is reached and higher levels 
increase propensity to enter. 
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Similarly, McGrath & Nerkar (2004) found that pharmaceutical firms were more likely to invest 
in growth options in a new area when the scope of opportunity was large (opportunity arrival 
signal) and competitive preemption was considered likely (opportunity expiration signal).  
Subsequent studies of international joint ventures provide support for the proposition that 
greater uncertainty increases the value of holding an option. Reuer & Tong (2005) found that 
higher uncertainty in external host country conditions and internal technical experience increased 
the likelihood that international joint venture agreements would contain an explicit option to 
acquire equity in the future. Similarly, Tong, Reuer & Peng (2008) found that conditions of 
greater uncertainty, specifically joint ventures with minority stakes or that are outside the firm’s 
core business, increased the option value of the firm. Conversely, conditions of less uncertainty 
such as majority stakes or core business joint ventures did not increase the option value of the 
firm. 
Oriani & Sobrero (2008) investigated the market value of the firm’s R&D investment 
under conditions of technical and market uncertainty. They found evidence consistent with 
theory that greater market uncertainty increases the value of the option to delay further 
investment. However, this relationship reached an inflection point beyond which increasing 
uncertainty decreased the value of the option to delay and increased the value the growth option 
created by incremental investment in R&D. This U-shaped relationship suggests that when 
market growth potential is very high growth options have more value than options to delay. 
Conversely, greater technical uncertainty increased the value of growth and flexibility options 
initially, but again reached an inflection point beyond which the value of these options declined. 
This inverted U relationship suggests that when technical uncertainty is very high, the option to 
delay has higher value than growth and flexibility options. Overall, these findings support theory 
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on the tensions between the option to delay investment and the incremental investment in growth 
or flexibility options.  
These findings are consistent with earlier studies of uncertainty and market entry 
decisions. Folta & O’Brien (2004) found evidence of a non-monotonic relationship such that 
uncertainty decreases the propensity to enter new markets (option to delay) until a threshold is 
reached; then higher levels increase the propensity to enter new markets (growth option). 
The third type of uncertainty, and perhaps of most interest to strategic management 
scholars, is that segment of external uncertainty that firms can influence through strategic action 
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). Real 
options investments have been characterized as strategic actions aimed at influencing external 
uncertainty idiosyncratically in favor of the firm, without benefitting all firms (McGrath, 1997; 
Kulatilaka & Perotti, 1998). Options investments in technological innovations move firms up the 
experience curve ahead of competitors, reducing internal uncertainty (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 
2001). These investments also influence the technological platform in the industry to move in the 
direction of the firm’s technology, reducing external uncertainty in its favor (Kim & Kogut, 
1996). This secures an advantageous industry position for the firm; while firms without prior 
experience will be at a disadvantage, as will those that committed fully to investments that are 
not aligned with the emergent industry technology (Kulatilaka & Perotti, 1998;). Thus, 
investments in technological innovations using a real options approach influence the competitive 
environment in favor of the innovating firm (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001; McGrath, 1997). 
Jacobides et al., 2006) along with Pisano & Teece (2007) propose that firms may influence 
industry architectures in their favor through proactive engagement of potential partners and 
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rivals. Some of this engagement is likely to be in the form of deliberate external 
commercialization through other firms (Chesbrough, 2003; Pisano & Teece, 2007).  
To summarize, internal uncertainty is reduced through learning and experience (Kogut & 
Zander, 1992; Reus et al., 2009), and external uncertainty is resolved as market and competitive 
scenarios are revealed through new information (Reus et al., 2009; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1996). In addition options investments in capabilities may influence the resolution of uncertainty 
in the firm’s favor, which positions the firm to exploit the opportunity advantageously relative to 
industry competitors (Kim & Kogut, 1996; Jacobides et al., 2006). Thus, from a real options 
perspective uncertainty is construed as an opportunity (Kogut, 1991; Kim & Kogut, 1996) rather 
than a threat (Cyert & March, 1963). Optimal exploitation of these opportunities depends on the 
third tenet of real options theory, managerial flexibility. 
Managerial Flexibility 
Managerial flexibility to adapt strategic investment decisions in a contingent fashion is 
the third principle of option value (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). Managerial flexibility captures the 
intuitive appeal of ‘keeping your options open’ in uncertain environments (Bowman & Hurry, 
1993). “In sum, real options are investments that can be characterized as sequential, irreversible 
investments made under conditions of uncertainty. The options create value by generating future 
decision right and, in this way, providing strategic flexibility. This flexibility is more valuable 
the higher the level of uncertainty” (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2008). This flexibility is expressed in 
different option decisions which include hold, exercise or abandonment (Copeland & Antikarov, 
2001; Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999).  
Hold. Managers may hold the option created by the initial investment until more 
information is known and uncertainty is reduced. For example, minority stakes in joint ventures 
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can be held until favorable demand signals trigger managers to exercise the option and increase 
the equity stake in the joint venture (Folta, 1998; Folta & Miller, 2002; Folta & O’Brien, 2004). 
However, holding the option is valuable only if the forthcoming information is worth more than 
the risk of competitive pre-emption (Trigeorgis, 1996). Holding an option is often referred to as a 
timing option or an option to delay (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999). 
Exercise. Options are exercised when opportunity arrival or expiration signals prompt 
managers to act (Bowman & Hurry, 1993). Options are fully exercised when full investments are 
made to complete the project, such as acquisition of a joint venture partner or commercialization 
of a new product. Alternatively, when options are exercised incrementally a series of nested 
options are created and this sequence is followed until the project is completed or abandoned. 
Abandonment. Abandonment refers to the decision to stop investment and cancel the 
project (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). If the project changes form and 
continues, this is considered a nested option, rather than abandonment (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; 
McGrath et al., 2004). Recalling that the premise of options is to limit downside risk while 
enhancing upside potential, the option to halt investment and abandon the project must be 
available (Adner & Levinthal, 2004a). “It is precisely the choice of walking away from a venture 
that gives meaning to the term 'option', incidentally” (Hurry et al., 1992: p. 97). A good deal of 
debate surrounding the abandonment option and the risk of option traps continues in the 
literature (Adner & Levinthal, 2004a; Adner & Levinthal, 2004b; McGrath et al., 2004).  
An option trap describes managers propensity to continue rather than abandon projects 
(Adner & Levinthal, 2004a). Options traps are facilitated by the fact that real options do not have 
an expiration date and can be held or nested indefinitely (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). Adner & 
Levinthal (2004) argue that real options must include ex-ante criteria for project abandonment to 
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meet the options assumption of limits on downside risk. When real options are applied without 
abandonment criteria managers are caught in option traps that facilitate their tendency to 
continue projects, rather than cancel them (Barnett, 2008; Coff & Laverty, 2001). In the option 
trap scenario managers avoid cancellation of projects that might be successful in the future. 
However, this means continuing projects that may be unsuccessful and is likely to result in 
overinvestment (Adner & Levinthal, 2004b). This is a type I error, equivalent to accepting an 
incorrect hypothesis. Conversely, evaluation processes that emphasize risk reduction to avoid 
type I errors, may result in underinvestment and missed opportunities. This is a type II error, 
equivalent to rejecting a correct hypothesis (Chesbrough, 2003; Coff & Laverty, 2001). This 
tradeoff, depicted in Table 2.3, is at least partly imposed by the boundaries of the firm.  
Table 2.3 Errors in Internal Commercialization of Innovations 
 Abandon Commercialize 
Innovation would be 
successful 
Type II error 
Incorrectly abandon an 
otherwise successful innovation 
 
Correctly commercialize a 
successful innovation 
Innovation would be 
unsuccessful 
Correctly abandon an 
unsuccessful innovation 
Type I error 
Incorrectly commercialize an 
unsuccessful innovation 
 
 
Consider the option to commercialize an innovation. When evaluated within the 
boundaries of the firm the decision alternatives are to hold, exercise or abandon. Holding the 
option means delaying commercialization but keep the project alive. This is the scenario that 
leads to potential option traps of continuing projects indefinitely in the absence of abandonment 
criteria (Adner & Levinthal, 2004a). Exercising the option involves a full investment in 
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commercialization of the innovation (and risk of type I error). Abandonment halts investment in 
the innovation, realizing full sunk costs (and risk of type II error). However, options for external 
commercialization (outside the boundaries of the firm) have potential to mitigate the tradeoffs 
inherent in closed (internal) innovation approaches (Chesbrough, 2003). An option to license a 
patent or process to an outside firm strikes a balance between in avoiding both type I and type II 
errors. For example, licensing a technology to an outside firm enables the firm to both save the 
full cost of commercialization and recoup some of the investment through licensing fees 
(Fosfuri, 2006). 
In sum, this section provided a review of real options theory framed by the core tenets of 
irreversibility, uncertainty and managerial flexibility. Table 2.2 summarizes the empirical 
literature on real options theory. The section concluded with the risks of real options traps and 
the tradeoffs associated with innovation commercialization decisions. I suggested that external 
commercialization may mitigate this compromise. In the next section I introduce external 
commercialization, framing it as a real option on the underlying investment in innovation. 
External Commercialization  
External commercialization introduces a broader set of alternatives for exercising the 
option to commercialize an innovation. For example, the firm may commercialize an innovation 
outside the firm through mechanisms such as outlicensing, sale of intellectual property rights, 
corporate venturing, or spin offs (Arora, Fosfuri & Gambardella, 2004; Grindley & Teece, 1997). 
External commercialization enables exercise of the innovation option without full investment in 
commercialization (McGrath, 1997). It also allows the firm to realize revenue and recoup R&D 
investment on innovations that might otherwise not be commercialized within the firm 
(Chesbrough, 2003; Rivette & Kline, 2000). 
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Thus, considering external commercialization options increases the option value on 
innovation by increasing the upside potential while limiting downside risk and decreasing the 
chance of error (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001). Specifically, it activates an additional range of 
outcomes, increasing the variance of outcomes on the upside and therefore the value of the 
option (McGrath, 1997; Myers, 1977). Further, it capitalizes on the advantages of a sequence of 
nested options that are enacted/emergent over time as both endogenous and exogenous 
uncertainties are reduced (Kim & Kogut, 1996). Finally, it relaxes constraints on the 
idiosyncratic value of the option to the focal firm by considering commercialization avenues 
outside firm boundaries (Teece et al., 1997; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2008). However, further 
guidance is needed to understand what conditions prompt a firm to exercise an external 
commercialization option. The logic to address these questions of external commercialization 
and implications for firm performance is provided by the appropriability framework (Teece, 
1986) which I discuss in the next section. 
Appropriability Framework 
“In reality, however, an innovation at its early stages – consisting perhaps of 
an invention plus some ideas about its application – presents a rich variety of 
potentials, a set of options that might be pursued in diverse ways. This range of 
meaning for what the innovation is, has much to do with the range of 
appropriability strategies available to the innovator” (Winter, 2006: p. 1104). 
Teece (1986) introduced the appropriability framework in his seminal work on Profiting 
from Innovation. Appropriability refers to how value generated by the innovation is distributed 
among the innovating firm and other entities in the industry such as rivals, imitators, suppliers or 
customers (Ceccagnoli, 2009; Teece, 1986; Winter, 2006). The appropriability framework 
(Teece, 1986) identifies conditions which influence the extent to which the innovating firm will 
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appropriate value from its own innovation. The framework proposed that innovating firms would 
appropriate value based on: 1) the degree of control over complementary assets, 2) the strength 
of the appropriability regime (the extent of IP protection), and 3) market timing (environmental 
uncertainty). 
Complementary assets are the processes, resources, and related products and services 
necessary to commercialize the focal innovation (Teece, 1986). Complementary assets may be 
controlled by the innovating firm or by other firms including rivals, suppliers, customers or 
providers of related products and services (Tripsas, 1997). The extent of the firm’s control over 
complementary assets determines the value that the innovating firm will appropriate relative to 
other firms, with greater control resulting in higher appropriation for the innovating firm (Teece, 
1986).  
 
The appropriability regime is “the protection afforded the innovator by intellectual 
property protection and natural barriers to imitation” (Pisano & Teece, 2007: p. 279). The 
strength of the appropriability regime influences the value that the innovating firm will 
appropriate relative to other firms, with stronger appropriability regimes favoring higher 
appropriation by the innovating firm (Cohen et al., 2000; Teece, 1986).  
Table 2.4 Predictions from the Appropriability Framework 
Appropriability 
Dimensions 
High Appropriation  by the 
Innovating Firm 
Low Appropriation  by the 
Innovating Firm 
Degree of control over 
complementary assets 
High control over 
complementary assets 
Low control over 
complementary assets 
Strength of appropriability 
regime 
Strong appropriability 
regime Weak appropriability regime 
Market timing/ level of 
uncertainty 
Low uncertainty associated 
with market timing 
High uncertainty associated 
with market timing 
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The market timing component of the appropriability framework captures the influence of 
environmental uncertainty on appropriability (Teece, 1986). For example the emergence of a 
dominant design or technology in the product market (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975), the size 
and growth of market demand and competitive rivalry are all uncertainties that influence the 
innovating firm’s ability to appropriate value from its own innovation (Pisano & Teece, 2007). 
The dimensions of the appropriability framework and the general prediction for appropriation by 
the innovating firm are summarized in Table 2.4 
Summary 
This chapter began with a review of real options theory. The key tenets of irreversibility, 
uncertainty and managerial flexibility undergird the premise of real option value; namely, the 
ability to increase potential gain while limiting downside loss. Real options are created by an 
initial investment in a project that provides the firm preferential access to opportunity in the 
future. Once created, managers have the flexibility to hold, exercise or abandon the option. Real 
options apply to investments in innovation which occur in environments of uncertainty. Because 
not all outcomes can be predicted ex-ante, incremental investments in innovation yield a series of 
nested options.  
Next, I illustrated how introducing the option to commercialize the innovation externally 
had a twofold effect: first, increasing the value of the option by increasing the number of 
alternatives for profiting from the innovation, second, reducing the hazards of option traps by 
introducing commercialization options outside firm boundaries. Finally, I introduced the 
appropriability framework. Appropriability conditions of complementary assets, appropriability 
regime (intellectual property protection) and market timing/uncertainty influence the firm’s 
ability to profit from innovation.  
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In the next section I map the appropriability framework (complementary assets, 
appropriability regime and market timing) onto the tenets of real options theory (irreversibility, 
uncertainty and managerial flexibility) to develop the theoretical model which informs the two 
research questions in this dissertation. 1. What conditions influence the extent to which a firm 
engages in external commercialization? 2. To what extent does external commercialization 
influence firm performance? 
Theoretical Model 
The foundation for the theoretical model is real options theory. Real options theory 
provides a heuristic for decision making under uncertainty. In the literature review I identified 
three tenets of real options theory: irreversibility of investment, uncertainty and managerial 
flexibility (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). Irreversibility of investment and uncertainty are further 
delimited by the constructs introduced in the appropriability framework; specifically 
complementary assets, appropriability regime and market timing (Teece, 1986). The relationship 
between the tenets of real options theory and the dimensions of the appropriability framework 
are highlighted in Table 2.5 
The model is based on an assumption that the investment in innovation is an irreversible 
investment in an underlying asset which the firm has the option to invest in further and 
ultimately commercialize at some time in the future (McGrath, 1997; Miller, 2002).Whether the 
asset is in the form of a patent, trade secret or tacit know-how, it constitutes valuable intellectual 
property that the firm can potentially profit from (Teece, 1986). Firms that allocate resources to 
research and development capability accumulate a stock of intellectual property assets and are 
motivated to earn a return on this investment. Commercialization of the innovation earns a return 
on the investment in innovation and contributes to overall firm performance (Hamel, 2000; 
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Rosenbusch et al., 2011). The extent of the contribution to firm performance is further influenced 
by the dimensions of the appropriability framework (Teece, 1986). 
From a real options perspective an investment in complementary assets is also an 
irreversible investment made by the innovating firm. Successful commercialization of the focal 
innovation often requires complementary assets which the firm may or may not already own 
(Teece, 1986; Tripsas, 1997). For example, investment in a chemical plant may be required to 
produce and commercialize a patented compound on a large scale (Fosfuri, 2006). The 
appropriability framework predicts that the firms control over complementary assets influences 
the extent to which it is likely to appropriate value from its own innovation such that low control 
over complementary assets diminishes the level of appropriability (Teece, 1986).  
The dimensions of uncertainty in this real options model are also provided by the 
appropriability framework; specifically the appropriability regime and market timing. The 
appropriability regime is the strength of intellectual property protection or barriers to imitation 
available to the innovating firm (Pisano & Teece, 2007). Although formal intellectual property 
protection laws are present, limitations and loopholes in rules and enforcements introduce 
uncertainty regarding whether the innovating firm will be able to protect its innovation (Cohen et 
al., 2000). The appropriability framework proposes a direct relationship between the 
appropriability regime (strength of intellectual property protection) and the ability of the 
innovating firm to appropriate profits from the innovation. Overall, a weak appropriability 
regime enables competitors to imitate and appropriate a relatively large share of profits away 
from the innovating firm. 
The market timing dimension of the appropriability framework captures how 
environmental uncertainty influences whether or not firms are likely to appropriate profits from 
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innovation (Teece, 1986). For example the emergence of a dominant technology in the product 
market, the size and growth of demand and competitive rivalry are all external uncertainties that 
influence the timing with which the firm may exercise their option (Pisano & Teece, 2007). 
Firms holding an option on valuable intellectual property may adjust the timing of the exercise, 
trading off the benefit of uncertainty reduction with the risk of competitive preemption (Bowman 
& Hurry, 1993; Jacobides et al., 2006). The appropriability framework demonstrates how the 
uncertainty captured by market timing influences the level of appropriation garnered by the 
innovating firm. Broadly speaking, higher levels of uncertainty imply lower levels of 
appropriation for the innovating firm. 
While the appropriability framework makes general predictions about the share of value 
that will accrue to the innovating firm, it also suggest that managers may influence the level of 
appropriability by selecting contingent strategies. Therefore managerial flexibility, the third tenet 
of real options theory, is proposed as an intervening variable in the model.  
Table 2.5 Mapping the Appropriability Framework to Real Options Theory 
Real Options Theory Irreversibility Uncertainty Managerial flexibility 
Appropriability 
Framework 
• Innovation  
• Complementary     
assets 
• Market timing 
• Appropriability 
regime 
• Commercialization 
strategy 
 
Managerial flexibility is expressed in the manager’s selection of commercialization 
strategy. Managers have flexibility to choose from internal and/or external commercialization 
options (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2008).  
The theoretical model is shown in Figure 2.1. The choice of commercialization strategy 
will be influenced by the appropriability conditions; specifically, irreversible investment in 
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complementary assets and the uncertainty associated with the appropriability regime and market 
timing. Accordingly, managers will select a commercialization strategy that enhances the level of 
appropriation for the innovating firm (Jacobides et al., 2006; Pisano & Teece, 2007). Therefore 
the commercialization strategy mediates the appropriability conditions impact on firm 
performance. This model depicts the commercialization strategy as a mediator of the relationship 
between appropriability conditions and firm performance in an integrated model of real options 
theory and the appropriability framework. The hypotheses in the next section explicate each of 
the appropriability conditions and demonstrate how the choice of commercialization strategy 
under these conditions influences firm performance.  
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H2a (+) 
H1b (-) 
Irreversibility 
Managerial Flexibility 
Uncertainty 
H1a (+) 
External 
Commercialization Firm Performance 
H3 (+) 
H2b (-) 
Appropriability 
Regime 
Market 
Timing 
Environmental 
Dynamism 
Environmental 
Complexity 
H1b:H2b (+)  
H4 (+) 
Complementary 
Assets 
H2a (+) 
Figure 2.1 Real Options and External Commercialization 
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Hypotheses Development 
In this section I hypothesize that each of the dimensions of the appropriability 
framework, complementary assets, appropriability regime, and market timing/uncertainty, 
influences the selection of a contingent commercialization strategy and firm performance. 
Specifically, an external commercialization strategy mediates the relationship between the 
appropriability conditions and firm performance. These relationships are depicted in Figure 2.1 
and the logic is provided under each sub-heading in this section. 
Complementary Assets  
Complementary assets is one dimension of the appropriability framework (Teece, 1986). 
Innovations rarely stand alone; more often than not, they must be accompanied by 
complementary assets to capture value. Drawing from Teece (1986; 2006), I define 
complementary assets as the processes, resources, and related products and services necessary to 
commercialize the focal innovation. Complementary assets may be controlled by the innovating 
firm or by other firms including rivals, suppliers, customers or providers of related products and 
services. The extent of the firm’s control over complementary assets determines the value that 
the innovating firm will appropriate relative to other firms.  
However, it is unlikely that the innovating firm will control all of the complementary 
assets it needs (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). If the needed complementary assets are generic, i.e., 
multi-purpose and widely available in the market, the innovating firm can retain a high degree of 
control and stay well-positioned to appropriate value from the innovation. In contrast, specialized 
complementary assets have high value with respect to the innovation but relatively low value 
outside this complementary role. Therefore investments in specialized complementary assets 
involve higher risk because of the dependence on the focal innovation (Teece, 1986). 
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Additionally, innovating firms often lack the knowledge or resources to develop or acquire 
specialized complementary assets, or cannot do so with sufficient urgency (McGrath, 1997; 
Pisano & Teece, 2007) and must therefore rely on other firms to provide specialized 
complementary assets. By doing so, the innovating firm must relinquish a degree of control, and 
some share of the profits, from the innovation (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). As an extreme case of 
specialized complementary assets are bottleneck assets. These are necessary, non-substitutable, 
and in limited supply (Teece, 1986), which means the provider of the bottleneck assets has a high 
degree of control over those assets (Pisano & Teece, 2007). Moreover, an innovating firm that 
needs access to the bottleneck assets must share a portion of their innovation’s value with the 
firm that controls the bottleneck assets (Pisano & Teece, 2007). Thus, the firm’s control over 
complementary assets and consequent share of appropriability depends on the specialization as 
well as the ownership of the complementary asset.  
The link between complementary assets and appropriability is supported by evidence that 
complementary assets are more effective in appropriating value from innovation than is patent 
protection (Cohen et al., 2000). Accordingly, innovating firms with less control over 
complementary assets are challenged to seek alternative strategies for appropriating value from 
the innovation (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006). External commercialization strategies may benefit 
innovating firms with limited control over complementary assets that still hope to preserve 
appropriation from innovation. Indeed, research confirms that firms with less control over 
complementary assets have a higher propensity to license innovations (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 
2006).  
Through a deliberate external commercialization strategy, innovating firms can benefit 
from leveraging another firm’s superior position in complementary assets in at least three ways 
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(Chesbrough, 2003). First, the presence of the complementary assets expands the market for the 
innovation, creating more value to be distributed among the innovating firm as well as the firms 
providing complementary assets (Jacobides et al., 2006). Second, proactively linking the focal 
innovation to the complementary assets of other firms allows those firms to appropriate value 
from the innovation, discouraging potential imitation (Teece & Pisano, 2007). Finally, 
leveraging other firms’ complementary assets enables the innovating firm to allocate scarce 
resources to the focal innovation while sharing the risk of investment in complementary assets 
with other firms (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). Thus, innovating firms that exploit the complementary 
assets of other firms through external commercialization strategies are likely to increase their 
share of profits from innovation and enhance firm performance. Therefore I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1a:  There is a positive relationship between complementary assets 
and firm performance.  
Hypothesis 1b: The commercialization decision mediates the positive 
relationship between complementary assets and firm performance. Specifically, 
less control over complementary assets will lead to increased levels of external 
commercialization and subsequent increased firm performance. 
Appropriability Regime  
Following complementary assets, the appropriability is a second dimension of the 
appropriability framework (Teece, 1986). The appropriability regime is defined as “the 
protection afforded the innovator by intellectual property protection and natural barriers to 
imitation” (Pisano & Teece, 2007: p. 279). The strength of the appropriability regime in an 
industry is determined by the industry participants’ use of patents, trade secrets, and natural 
barriers to imitation to protect their innovations (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000). 
Appropriability regimes vary widely across industries and range from tight, in which innovators 
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enjoy a high degree of protection, to weak, in which innovators experience lower levels of 
protection (Teece, 1986).  
Tight appropriability regimes offer high levels of protection for innovators through the 
use of patents, trade secrets, and natural barriers to imitation. Firms in industries with tight 
appropriability regimes have high rates of patenting and protect their innovations with aggressive 
patenting strategies (Cohen et al., 2000). For example, firms may use a patent blocking strategy 
by securing patents for their innovations as well as any related and substitute technologies, 
effectively creating a patent fence around the area of the innovation to preempt imitation by 
competitors (Cohen et al., 2000). Cross-licensing agreements that provide reciprocal access to 
technology among industry participants, who are often competitors, also motivate aggressive 
patenting in an industry because firms need strong patent stocks to increase their bargaining 
power in cross-licensing negotiations and disputes (Grindley & Teece, 1997).  
When legal patent protections are not necessary or obtainable (Cohen et al., 2000), firms 
in industries with tight appropriability regimes can also use trade secrets and natural barriers to 
imitation to protect their innovations. Trade secrets are effective in protecting products such as 
chemical compounds or recipes that are difficult to imitate or reverse engineer after they are 
released in the market; thus, trade secrets are preferred over patents when the amount of 
information disclosed in the patent facilitates rather than prevents imitation (Cohen et al., 2000). 
Alternatively, natural barriers to imitation are inherent in the innovation itself; for example, 
process innovations tend to be inimitable because they are tightly linked to other firm capabilities 
and are not readily observable (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Ettlie & Reza, 1992). The 
protections offered by patents, trade secrets, and natural barriers to imitation in tight 
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appropriability regimes allow firms a high level of appropriation of profits from innovation and 
subsequent contribution to firm performance (Teece, 1986).  
In contrast, weak appropriability regimes offer less protection from patents, trade secrets, 
and natural barriers to imitation (Nelson, 2006). Several conditions contribute to deficiencies in 
intellectual property protection. Lack of novelty is one reason that patents are either not sought 
or denied. When granted, the patent often covers a narrow area leaving room for imitators to 
invent around the scope of protection (Cohen et al., 2000). The expense of application, 
maintenance and enforcement of patents is another barrier to full patent protection, particularly 
for firms with limited resources (Gans & Stern, 2010). Additionally, trade secrets are not 
effective for products that can be easily reverse-engineered and many products do not have the 
inimitable characteristics common to process innovations (Leiponen & Byrma, 2009). Thus, 
innovating firms operating in environments with weak appropriability regimes have few 
protections available to them and often experience rapid imitation through which rivals may 
quickly appropriate profits (Teece, 1986). Thus innovating firms operating in weak 
appropriability regimes are less likely to accrue performance benefits from innovation than those 
in tight appropriability regimes.  
Innovating firms that enjoy the protection afforded by tight appropriability regimes are 
able to appropriate profits from innovation through traditional vertically integrated 
commercialization. Indeed, firms using patent blocking strategies typical under conditions of 
tight appropriability regimes were found to be less likely to license their intellectual property 
(Motohashi, 2008). However, firms operating in weak appropriability regimes cannot rely on 
intellectual property protection to appropriate profit from innovation. Innovators challenged by 
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weak appropriability regimes may increase their profits from innovation by pursuing an external 
commercialization strategy (Chesbrough, 2003).  
External commercialization allows the innovator to appropriate value in several ways. 
First, the innovator receives direct licensing revenue. Second, more market participants helps 
stimulate demand for the innovation, expanding the rate of growth and size of the market. Third, 
providing access to the technology through deliberate licensing pre-empts accidental spillover 
and deters competitive imitation. In effect, the external commercialization strategy enables the 
innovating firm to secure a position in the industry that allows continued appropriation of a 
portion of the profit from innovation while facilitating appropriation by others. Under conditions 
of a weak appropriability regime, an external commercialization strategy enables appropriation 
of profit from innovation which contributes to enhanced firm performance. Therefore I 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2a:  There is a positive relationship between appropriability regime 
and firm performance.  
Hypothesis 2b: The commercialization decision mediates the positive 
relationship between the appropriability regime and firm performance. 
Specifically, a weaker appropriability regime will lead to increased levels of 
external commercialization and subsequent increased firm performance. 
Market Timing  
Market timing is the third appropriability condition in the framework (Teece, 1986) and 
manifests the uncertainty underlying real options theory (Bowman & Hurry, 1983; McGrath, 
1997). Market timing includes the presence or absence of a dominant technology or design 
(Utterback & Abernathy, 1975), the size and growth of the market (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1996) and competitive rivalry (Derfus, Maggitti, Grimm & Smith, 2008; Porter, 1985). The 
degree to which the innovating firm can potentially profit from innovation is influenced by these 
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sources of environmental uncertainty (Teece 1986). Environmental uncertainty refers to “the 
extent to which future states of the environment can be anticipated or accurately predicted” 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986: p. 445). Two dimensions of environmental uncertainty that are 
relevant to innovation are environmental dynamism and environmental complexity (Dess & 
Beard, 1984; Duncan, 1972; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996).  
Environmental dynamism. Environmental dynamism is defined as the relative stability 
versus instability in the industry and is often described as turbulence (Aldrich, 1979; Dess & 
Beard, 1984). Dynamism refers to unpredictability in the rate and magnitude of change in the 
external environment (Duncan, 1972; Reus et al., 2009).  
Environments high in dynamism are those in which “changes in demand, competition, 
and technology are rapid and discontinuous” (Eisenhardt, 1989: p. 544). Technology changes are 
characteristic of new/product markets, industry and technological convergence and disruptive 
innovations (Thompson, 1967; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). The early stages of technological 
innovation involve a good deal of experimentation and trial and error by industry participants 
prior to the emergence of a dominant design (Teece, 1986; Utterback & Abernathy, 1975). High 
rates of industry entry and exit during this period make changes in the competitive structure 
unpredictable (Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984). Accordingly, the size and timing of demand, 
demand preferences and demand shifts between rivals are also unpredictable (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Dynamism is typically higher in the early 
stages of product/market development before settling down through technical effort and the 
passage of time (McGrath, 1997; Miller & Friesen, 1984). Conversely, environmental dynamism 
is generally lower in later stages of the product/market life cycle. A dominant design has 
emerged and technological innovations evolve around this dominant design (Teece, 1986; 
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Utterback & Abernathy, 1975). Industry architectures are well defined and market shares are 
relatively stable (Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984). Likewise, demand growth and preferences are 
more predictable (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996).  
Recent evidence from the competitive dynamics literature shows that environmental 
dynamism, as well as complexity, contributes to volatility in firm performance (D’Aveni et al., 
2010; Thomas & D’Aveni, 2009). As dynamism increases industry leaders enjoy shorter periods 
of superior performance and fall more frequently from their top positions (Derfus et al., 2008; 
Wiggins & Ruefli, 2005). Studies suggest that dynamism, complexity and volatility in 
performance have increased and spread across industries over time (Thomas & D’Aveni, 2009; 
Wiggins & Ruefli, 2002). In these environments a repertoire of innovation strategies, like other 
competitive moves, are critical to firm performance (Chesbrough et al., 2006; Chen, Katila, 
McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2010; Miller & Chen, 1996). Indeed, firms in dynamic environments 
have been shown to create more options for innovation through R&D investments (Chen et al., 
2010). By extension, firms are also likely to expand their options for commercialization of 
innovation through external commercialization strategies. 
Dynamic environments offer a unique opportunity for innovating firms to shape the 
emerging technical and competitive dynamics of the industry in their favor (Santos & Eisenhardt, 
2009). External commercialization is one mechanism to achieve this (Jacobides et al., 2006; 
Pisano & Teece, 2007). Indeed, scholars propose that environmental dynamism increases the rate 
of inter-firm cooperation (Rosenkopf & Schilling, 2007). Findings confirm that innovating firms 
operating in turbulent industries are more likely to engage in deliberate external 
commercialization (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). Likewise, technical uncertainty 
stimulates demand for these innovations among industry participants (Arora & Gambardella, 
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2010a; Rothaermel & Alexandre, 2009; Rothaermel, Hitt & Jobe, 2006). Conversely, innovating 
firms in stable environments have less opportunity to influence technological, competitive and 
demand factors that are well established (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). Similarly, firms 
that dominate these stable industries have little incentive to proactively pull potentially disruptive 
innovations and new entrants into the mainstream of the industry (Christensen, 1997; Tushman 
& Anderson, 1986). Therefore innovating firms are more likely to pursue external 
commercialization strategies in turbulent rather than in stable environments.  
External commercialization strategies enable innovating firms in turbulent environments 
to influence the dominant technical design and architecture of the industry (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996; McGrath, 1997; Jacobides et al., 2006; Teece, 1986; Tushman & Anderson, 
1986). Innovating firms that make their innovation available to industry participants through an 
external commercialization strategy stimulate further development around their technology 
platform and thus increase the likelihood that the firm’s technology will emerge as the dominant 
design (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001; McGrath, 1997; Jacobides et al., 2006). In turn a broad base 
of support from industry participants may drive adoption of the innovating firm’s technology in 
specifications of industry standards (Chesbrough, 2003; Teece, 2006). Access to the innovating 
firm’s technology, granted through external commercialization agreements, will influence the 
extent to which industry participants choose to compete and/or occupy a position in the 
innovation value chain (Jacobides et al., 2006). Thus, the external commercialization strategy 
enables the innovating firm to secure a central position in the dominant design and industry 
architecture (Chesbrough, 2007; Pisano & Teece, 2007).  Therefore I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between environmental dynamism 
and external commercialization. 
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Environmental complexity. Another component of environmental uncertainty is 
complexity. Environmental complexity refers to the number, similarity and relatedness of the 
environmental elements affecting the firm (Dess & Beard, 1984; Duncan, 1972). One of the most 
important elements of a firm’s environment is other firms (Lawless & Anderson, 1996). For 
example, industry concentration takes into account the number of competitors, distribution of 
size and market share, and the range of product/market segments in the industry (Keats & Hitt, 
1988; Porter, 1980).  
Less complex environments have higher industry concentration, with few firms holding a 
large share of the market in a well defined industry (Keats & Hitt, 1988; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996). The industry structure is well established and dominated by powerful firms 
that impose order on competitive rivalry across the industry (Porter, 1980). Therefore less 
complex industries have lower uncertainty (Dess & Beard, 1984). In contrast, more complex 
environments have lower industry concentration, with numerous well balanced rivals competing 
vigorously for market share (Porter, 1980). The scope of the industry tends to be diverse and 
segmented, and the boundaries of the industry are more fluid (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; 
Lawless & Anderson, 1996; Porter, 1980). Thus there is higher uncertainty in these industries 
(Dess & Beard, 1984).  
Environmental complexity, similar to dynamism discussed in Hypothesis 3, increases the 
volatility of firm performance (D’Aveni, 1994; Thomas & D’Aveni, 2009; Wiggins & Ruefli, 
2005). Likewise a broader repertoire of innovation strategies is required to sustain performance 
in these environments (Miller & Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 2010). Thus, the level of environmental 
complexity influences the propensity for firms to pursue external innovation strategies 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2002; Powell, 1990).  
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External commercialization strategies in less complex environments are likely to be 
shaped by the structure of the industry with firms on the periphery seeking agreements with 
industry leaders (Ahuja, 2000; Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996). However, industry leaders 
may have little incentive to cooperate with other firms that do not offer advantages that the 
leading firm does not already control. If agreements are made, for example in the case of access 
to a novel technology, the leading firm is likely to leverage superior bargaining power to secure 
favorable terms (Ahuja, 2000; Powell et al., 1996). Evidence confirms that less complex 
environments with less uncertainty have fewer inter-firm agreements for innovation (Eisenhardt 
& Schoonhoven, 1996; Shan, 1990). In these industries the agreements follow a hub and spoke 
pattern with large firms at the center (Rosenkopf & Schilling, 2007). Therefore, I expect 
innovating firms in less complex environments to engage in external commercialization 
agreements less frequently. 
Conversely in more complex and highly uncertain environments innovating firms are 
under intense competitive and performance pressure and technical knowledge and access to 
markets is distributed among many firms in multiple segments of the industry (Porter, 1980; 
Powell et al., 1996). Innovating firms in complex environments are more motivated to engage in 
external commercialization of innovations for several reasons. First, there is a balance between 
firms in the industry such that there are likely to be incentives and opportunities for both parties 
to form an agreement (Ahuja, 2000; Chesbrough, 2007). Second, external commercialization, 
like other innovation agreements, can enhance performance resilience in these highly 
competitive markets (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). Findings show that more complex 
environments with higher uncertainty increase the number inter-firm agreements for innovation 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2002). The patterns of these 
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agreements are more web-like with multiple nodes, and multiple relationships per firm 
(Rosenkopf & Schilling, 2007). Therefore I expect innovating firms in highly complex 
environments to engage in external commercialization agreements more frequently. Therefore I 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between environmental complexity 
and external commercialization. 
Chapter 2 began with a review of the literature on real options theory and introduced the 
appropriability framework. Next, the theoretical model integrating real options and the 
appropriability framework explained why firms may engage in external commercialization and 
the expected impact on firm performance. Finally, testable hypotheses were developed. The next 
chapter provides an overview of the methods used to test these hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 3 METHODS 
This Chapter describes the methodology used to test the hypotheses. The sample and data 
sources are identified followed by a description of the variables and measurement. The chapter 
concludes with an overview of the statistical analysis used to test the data. 
Sample and Data Sources 
Sample  
The sample includes firms in the manufacturing sector with primary two-digit SIC codes 
between 20 and 39 (Cohen et al., 2000; Rothaermel & Alexandre, 2009; Schilling & Steensma, 
2001). A comprehensive study period from 1990 – 2006 was selected. The sample was drawn 
from the Compustat database which contains accounting and financial data for firms traded on a 
North American exchange. I included data for firms designated on Compustat as both active and 
inactive to reduce survival bias. This allowed firms that entered and exited during the extended 
study period to be included in the sample. The initial set of 4,901 firms was screened to include 
firms that had reported the minimum seven years performance data required to measure prior and 
lagged performance in the study.  This produced an initial sample frame of 2,895 firms from the 
Compustat database.  The higher than anticipated incidence of missing data in the Compustat 
database resulted in elimination of an additional 1245 cases and a sample size of 1650.   Outliers 
were diagnosed using the Cook’s D test for influence at a threshold of 4/n (Bohon, forthcoming).  
This test identified 38 observations as outliers and 32 of these were omitted from the analysis.  
The final sample used in the analysis included 1618 firms in 11 industries. The distribution of 
industries represented in the sample is shown in table 3.1. 
To identify which of the 1618 sample firms had participated in external 
commercialization, the sample was matched against the firm-level external commercialization  
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Table 3.1 Distribution of Sample Firms by Industry 
Industry SIC Percent 
Apparel and fabric products 23 2.3  
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 28 22.5 
Concrete, stone, glass & related 32 1.5 
Electronic components 36 21.8 
Fabricated metals 34 2.4 
Food and kindred products 20 4.8 
Machinery and computers 35 17.4 
Paper and allied products 26 2.6 
Precision instruments incl. medical 38 17.0 
Rubber and plastics 30 2.5 
Transportation equipment 37 5.1 
Total  100 
data constructed from the SDC database. This data included 1438 firms that had participated in at 
least one external commercialization agreement during the study period.  (Details of how this 
data was constructed are provided in the in the next section under the variable description for 
external commercialization).   A total of 318 (19.7%) firms were matched using this procedure.  
Thus, the final sample of 1618 firms included 318 (19.7%) that had participated in external 
commercialization agreements during the study period from 1990 -2006.  The number of external 
commercialization agreements per firm ranged from 1 to 32. The frequency of external 
commercialization agreements for the sample is shown in Table 3.3.  
Data Sources 
The dataset for this study was compiled from multiple archival sources including the Thomson 
Reuters SDC Platinum Joint Ventures and Alliances database, National Bureau of Economic 
Research Patent Data Project (PDP) and Compustat. Additional data is accessed from the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), U.S. Census Bureau Center for Economic 
Studies (CES) and U.S. Census of Manufacturers. These data sources are described below and 
summarized in Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.2 Frequency of External 
Commercialization Agreements 
Number of 
Agreements 
Number 
of Firms 
Percent of 
Firms 
 0 1300  80.3 
 1  172  10.6 
 2  75  4.6 
 3  26  1.6 
 4 or more  45  2.8 
 Total  1618 100.0 
 
SDC Platinum. The Statistical Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database Joint 
Ventures and Alliances Module contains alliance information which is used in studies of 
alliances and innovation published in top strategic management journals (Anand & Khanna, 
2009; Hagedoorn, Lorenz-Orlean & Van Kranenburg, 2009; Schilling, 2009; Steensma & 
Schilling, 2001). The SDC Platinum database contains global securities and financial data for 
publicly traded firms. The Joint Ventures and Alliances Module is of most interest in this study. 
This data reports a wide range of alliances including joint ventures, manufacturing and marketing 
agreements, licensing agreements and more, and can be filtered by alliance characteristics. Each 
alliance also reports “deal text”, a synopsis which contains a detailed description of the 
agreement. According to Schilling (2009), the database contains more than 52,000 research or 
technology alliances from 1990 – 2005, and at least one alliance for each of 1,059 four-digit SIC 
codes. One noted caution of this database is that of underreporting (Hagedoorn et al., 2009). 
Although the database is compiled from an array of original sources including SEC filings, trade 
publications and news wires, most alliance types are not subject to mandatory reporting. 
Therefore the data likely represents a sample rather than a census of agreements. However, in a 
2009 study comparing the most commonly used alliance datasets Schilling concluded that 
“These results provide some reassurance that even though each database only captures a sample 
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of alliance activity, it may yield reliable results for many - if not all- research purposes” (2009: p. 
258). Details on how this data was used to construct the external commercialization variable are 
provided in the next section. 
NBER. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Patent Data Project (PDP) 
database matches patent and patent citation data from the USPTO to Compustat North America 
data (Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2001). NBER also publishes The Total Factor Productivity Index 
(TFP) used to measure the rate of technological change in this study. 
U.S. Census of Manufacturers. The U.S. Census of Manufacturers provides periodic 
and comprehensive statistics about manufacturing establishments, activities, and production. 
Industry concentration ratios for the measurement of environmental complexity are extracted 
from this data. 
Compustat. The Compustat North America database contains accounting and financial 
data for publicly traded firm in North America. Compustat data is used for measures of firm 
performance, R&D intensity, volatility, munificence and firm size.  
Variables and Measures 
The dependent, independent and control variables are described in this section. The 
mediator variable of interest - external commercialization - is treated as a count variable as 
discussed below. Each of the variable measures and data sources is summarized in Table 3.3. 
Dependent Variable: Firm Performance  
Firm Performance is measured by Return on Assets (ROA) computed at a four year time 
lag from the base year (Combs, Crook & Shook, 2005; Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986). The 
base year for performance measurement is the year of external commercialization, or the median 
year for firms that had multiple agreements. For firms that did not engage in external 
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commercialization the base years for performance were distributed to align with those of the 
external commercialization firms.  
Independent Variables  
In this section the measures for complementary assets, appropriability regime and 
environmental dynamism and complexity are described. 
Complementary assets. Complementary assets are measured by a count of the number 
of 4 digit SIC codes for the firm. A larger number of SIC codes indicates that the firm is likely to 
have complementary resources and capabilities that enhance the ability to appropriate value from 
commercialization of innovation. For example, a manufacturer of electronic medical equipment 
for imaging (SIC 3844) may also develop software to operate the equipment (SIC 7372) and 
precision mechanical instruments for the procedure (SIC 3841). A count rather than a distance 
measure was employed because the proximity or distance between the secondary and primary 
SIC codes do not necessarily indicate more or less complementarity, as evidenced by the 
previous example. 
Appropriability regime. Appropriability regime was previously defined as “the 
protection afforded the innovator by intellectual property protection and natural barriers to 
imitation” (Pisano & Teece, 2007: p. 279). Appropriability regimes tend to be homogeneous 
within industries and heterogeneous across industries (Cohen et al., 2000; Pisano & Teece, 
2007). Following Arora & Ceccagnoli (2006), I constructed a measure of appropriability regimes 
at the industry level based on data reported from the Carnegie Mellon Survey (CMS). The 
Carnegie Mellon Survey (CMS) is a comprehensive survey of R&D managers in the 
manufacturing sector (see Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, 2000 for the full report). To measure the 
effectiveness of appropriability mechanisms the CMS survey asked respondents to “report the 
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percentage of innovations for which each appropriability mechanism had been effective in 
protecting the firm’s competitive advantage from those innovations during the prior three years” 
(Cohen et al., 2000: p. 5). The response categories were < 10 percent, 10-40 percent, 41-60 
percent, 61-90 percent and > 90 percent. The CMS data was collected for six different 
appropriability mechanisms- complementary assets for sales and service, complementary assets 
for manufacturing, lead time, patents, secrecy and other legal means - these are not mutually 
exclusive categories and the percentages need not sum to 100 percent. Product and process 
innovations were tallied separately reported in 34 ISIC (International Standard Industrial 
Classification: United Nations Statistics Division) groups. 
To construct the appropriability regime variable for this study, I summed the percentages 
for patents, secrecy and other legal means across product and process innovations to create an 
index of effectiveness of appropriability regimes for each industry category. The value for the 
appropriability regime was assigned to each firm by matching the 2 or 3 digit SIC codes. The 
index ranges from 59 in the printing and publishing industry (SIC 27) to 154 in the medical 
equipment industry (SIC 384) with a mean of 113. A higher index indicates a stronger 
appropriability regime.  Although the CMS survey also included complementary assets and lead 
time, these were excluded from the appropriability regime measure in this study because the 
definition of appropriability regime refers specifically to the protection of intellectual property.  
Environmental dynamism. Similar to the appropriability regime and following previous 
literature, environmental dynamism and environmental complexity are appropriately measured at 
the industry level (Dess & Beard, 1984; Keats & Hitt, 1988). Environmental dynamism is 
indicated by the volatility as well as the rate of technological change in an industry (Dess & 
Beard, 1984; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Keats & Hitt, 1988).  Volatility is measured as 
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the standard error of the regression slope coefficient of annual revenue for all sample firms in an 
industry in the five years preceding the base year (Boyd, 1995; Goll & Rasheed, 1997; Keats & 
Hitt, 1988). This captures the deviation from the expected value of revenue in the industry (Dess 
& Beard, 1984).  
Measuring the rate of technological change in a large, multi-industry sample presents a 
challenge, precluding measures of change such as rate of new product introduction or rate of firm 
entry and exit that are often used in single-industry samples (Upson, Ketchen, Connelly & Ranft, 
2012). Schilling & Steensma (2001) applied a novel approach to measuring the rate of 
technological change in multi-industry studies. This measure is the Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) growth index (Bartelsman & Gray, 1996). The TFP growth index is calculated as the 
growth rate of outputs minus the weighted growth rates of five factor inputs (capital, production 
and non-production labor, materials and energy). The TFP growth index is calculated and made 
available through the National Bureau of Economic Research (Becker & Gray, 2009). To align 
the TFP index with the relevant study period I averaged the TFP growth index from 1990 
through 2005 and then assigned the index to firm-level data based on 2 or 3 digit SIC codes. 
Environmental complexity. Consistent with the definition and previous research I use 
competitive intensity as a proxy for environmental complexity (Dess & Beard, 1984; Eisenhardt 
& Schoonhoven, 1996; Keats & Hitt, 1988). Competitive intensity is measured as an index of the 
four firm concentration ratio (Ceccagnoli, 2009; Schilling & Steensma, 2001). This measure is 
taken From The 1997 U.S. Census Of Manufacturers. 
Mediating Variable: External Commercialization 
I previously defined external commercialization as an organization’s deliberate 
commercialization of technological knowledge to an outside organization, exclusively or in 
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addition to its internal application. Data for the external commercialization variable was obtained 
from the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum Database. A broad query for all types of agreements 
that involved firms in the manufacturing sector during the period 1990-2006 returned 10,758 
agreements. The data contained fields to indicate whether the agreement involved technology 
transfer and whether it included one or a combination of research and development, marketing, 
manufacturing or other types of activities. The “deal text” also provided a description of each 
agreement.  
The description for each agreement was examined to determine whether the agreement 
was external commercialization or some other type of agreement and identify which party to the 
agreement transferred the technology. I applied conservative inclusion rules to avoid 
confounding external commercialization with myriad other types of co-operative agreements 
between firms. Principal among these inclusion rules was that the agreement must involve 
technology transfer. Technology transfer agreements may use alliance, licensing, joint venture,  
spin-out or other mechanisms and may also be embedded in a manufacturing or research and 
development agreement. Technology transfer agreements were typically identified by 
descriptions such as “entered into a license agreement, granted a license to use, received the right 
to use” or “contributed it’s technology.” 
Agreements that did not include technology transfer were excluded from the 
operationalization of external commercialization. These agreements include brand licensing, 
contract manufacturing, OEM, and distribution agreements. Agreements that focused principally 
on operations were also excluded. These were usually described in the data as “joint venture to 
build and operate” or “joint venture to manufacture” (in a specific country) or “provide 
telecommunications services” in a country or region. Likewise, agreements that focused on 
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research and development described as “jointly develop” without further specification of 
technology transfer were considered research and development agreements only and therefore 
excluded from the agreements identified as external commercialization. 
Several other types of agreements were excluded. For example, agreements that were 
strictly for software licensing it were excluded. I also excluded cross-licensing agreements in the 
telecommunications industry commonly known as “license pools” aimed at interoperability 
standards across providers and devices. Agreements in which technology was transferred from a 
not for profit research organization or government entity were also excluded. Although these 
agreements are considered technology transfer they were excluded from this study because the 
analysis is concerned with financial performance outcomes.  
 Of the 10,758 agreements that were returned by the initial search query, 2312 were 
considered external commercialization agreements. These agreements were then aggregated to 
the firm level resulting in a sample of 1438 manufacturing firms that had participated in at least 
one external commercialization agreement during the study period. These firms were then 
matched to the sample according to the procedure described previously. The external 
commercialization variable is operationalized as a count of the number of agreements the firm 
entered into during the study period 1990-2006. 
Control Variables  
A necessary but not sufficient condition for a firm to engage in external 
commercialization of innovation is that the firm own valuable technological knowledge that it 
can market to other firms. Technological knowledge may exist in the form of protected 
intellectual property such as patents. However, patent strategies and the propensity to patent vary 
across industries (Cohen et al., 2000). Therefore a simple patent count may underestimate the 
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store of knowledge assets a firm possesses. Therefore, I use measures of patents and R&D 
intensity to capture a more comprehensive measure of knowledge assets (Heeley, Matusik & 
Jain, 2007). Patents are measured by the number of patents assigned to the firm during the study 
period. The data is obtained from the NBER, Patent Data Project (PDP) database (Hall et al., 
2001).  
A control for alliances was included to control for the firm’s propensity to form alliances 
of any type. Alliances is measured as a count variable of the total number of alliances formed by 
the focal firm during the study period, excluding those already classified as external 
commercialization. Data for the alliances was taken from the SDC Platinum database 
(Hagedoorn et al., 2009; Schilling & Steensma, 2001).  
Environmental munificence refers to the availability of resources in the environment for 
growth (Dess & Beard, 1984; Sirmon, Hitt, Arregle & Campbell, 2010). Munificence is 
operationalized as a growth measure computed as the regression slope coefficient of annual 
revenue for all firms in an industry using time lagged for five years following the base year as 
the independent variable (Boyd, 1995; Dess & Beard, 1984; Goll & Rasheed, 1997; Keats & 
Hitt, 1988).  
Prior performance is measured by ROA, calculated as a two-year average prior to the 
base year (Rothaermel & Alexandre, 2009). Firm size is measured by the number of employees 
in the base year. Firm age is calculated as the difference between the base year and founding 
year. 
Statistical Analysis 
The theoretical model specifies firm performance as the dependent variable and external 
commercialization as a mediator. Therefore I applied the Baron & Kenny (1986) recommended 
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approach to test for mediation.  The hypothesis tests were conducted primarily using an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) approach with hierarchical loading (Hair, Black, Babin & Anderson, 2009).  
The exception to this was the test for the direct relationship between the independent variables 
and the mediator external commercialization. 
External commercialization is a count variable with nearly 20% (318) of cases having at 
least one external commercialization agreement and 80% (1300) of cases having no external 
commercialization agreements.  A Poisson regression is often the preferred method of analysis 
for count data (Tang He & Tu, 2012).  However, the large number of zeros causes the 
distribution for external commercialization to be strongly skewed to the right, violating the 
assumption of the Poisson distribution for the mean and variance to be equal.  The variance of 
external commercialization is more than five times larger than the mean indicating 
overdispersion in the distribution of the data.  That is, greater variance than expected in a Poisson 
distribution.  In cases of overdispersion the negative binomial regression is often more 
appropriate (Long & Freese, 2006).   
The zero inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression is an extension of the standard 
negative binomial method.   The zero inflated method assumes that zeros result from two 
different processes.  Structural or excess zeros are present because there was no chance of 
occurrence. For example a count of how many prizes were won would equal zero for all those 
who did not purchase any raffle tickets.  This is different than a “real” zero in which raffle tickets 
were purchased but no prizes were won.  The ZINB model has two components that predict the 
distinction between real zeros (i.e., company had no commercialization agreements) and excess 
zeros (i.e., company was coded zero because data were not provided) (Long & Freese, 2006).  
Several tests of model fit were applied to confirm that the ZINB was the best fit for the data. The 
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Vuong test compares the model fit of the standard NB with the ZINB regression (Tang et al., 
2012). The alpha test compares the NB to the Poisson regression. The Stata “countfit” command 
is also useful for comparing alternative models for the data (Long & Freese, 2006). 
This Chapter has outlined the methodology used to test the hypotheses in this 
dissertation. The sample, data sources, variable measures and analysis were explained. The next 
Chapter reports the results of this analysis. 
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Table 3.3 Constructs, Measures and Data Sources 
Construct/ 
Variable Measure 
Data 
Source 
Measurement 
Support 
Dependent Variable 
Firm performance Four year average Return on Assets (ROA) lagged from the base year Compustat 
Ceccagnoli, 2009; 
Rothaermel & 
Alexandre, 2009 
Independent Variables 
Complementary 
assets Count of 4 digit SIC codes  Compustat 
Arora & Ceccagnoli, 
2006 
Environmental 
dynamism 
Volatility: standard error of the regression 
slope of annual revenue for all sample firms 
in a 2-digit SIC industry  
Compustat 
Keats & Hitt, 1988, 
Boyd, 1995; Dess & 
Beard, 1984;  
Rate of technological change: TFP growth 
2002 US 
Census of 
Mfg. 
Schilling & Steensma, 
2001 
Environmental 
complexity 
Concentration ratio of four largest firms in 
the industry 
2002 US 
Census of 
Mfg. 
Ceccagnoli, 2009; 
Schilling & Steensma, 
2001 
Appropriability 
regime 
Effectiveness of proprietary knowledge 
protection in the industry 
Cohen, 
Nelson & 
Walsh, 
2000 
Arora & Ceccagnoli, 
2006; Ceccagnoli, 
2009 
Mediating Variable 
External 
Commercialization 
Inter-firm agreements including technology 
transfer from the focal firm such as 
licensing, cross-licensing or spin outs.  
SDC 
Anand & Khanna, 
2000a; Hagedoorn, 
Lorenz-Orlean & van 
Kranenburg, 2008; 
Schilling, 2009 
Control Variables 
Technological 
knowledge 
R&D intensity: R&D expense/Revenue Compustat Heeley, Matusik & Jain, 2007 
Patent count: number of patents assigned to 
the firm during the study period NBER 
Ahuja, 2000; McGrath 
& Nerkar, 2004 
Alliances 
Count of alliances formed during the study 
period, excluding external 
commercialization agreements 
SDC Schilling, 2009 
Munificence 
Five year average growth of annual revenue 
following the base year for all sample firms 
in a 2-digit SIC industry 
Compustat Dess & Beard, 1984; Goll & Rasheed, 1997 
Firm prior 
performance 
Two year average ROA prior to the base 
year Compustat 
Rothaermel & 
Alexandre, 2009 
Firm size Count number of employees Compustat Ceccagnoli, 2009 
Firm age Years since founding LexisNexis Ceccagnoli, 2009 
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CHAPTER 4 RESULTS 
The results of the analysis are reported in three sections. The first section reports the 
results of the hypotheses tests. The next section describes several post-hoc tests. The last section 
proposes an alternative model specification. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables. 
Variance inflation factors (VIF) were examined and observed to be within recommended levels 
with most values less than 3 (Hair et al., 2009). The exceptions were the dummy variables 
created for industry controls, four of which exceeded a VIF of 10. I concluded that 
multicollinearity had little impact on the estimation results and all variables were retained in 
favor of complete model specification (Wooldridge, 2009). 
Results of Hypothesis Testing 
The theoretical model posits that external commercialization mediates the relationship 
between appropriability conditions and firm performance. These relationships were tested in the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a:  There is a positive relationship between complementary assets 
and firm performance.  
Hypothesis 1b: The commercialization decision mediates the positive 
relationship between complementary assets and firm performance. Specifically, 
less control over complementary assets will lead to increased levels of external 
commercialization and subsequent increased firm performance. 
Hypothesis 2a:  There is a positive relationship between appropriability regime 
and firm performance.  
Hypothesis 2b: The commercialization decision mediates the positive 
relationship between the appropriability regime and firm performance. 
Specifically, a weaker appropriability regime will lead to increased levels of 
external commercialization and subsequent increased firm performance. 
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Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between environmental dynamism 
and external commercialization. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between environmental complexity 
and external commercialization. 
The hypotheses were tested in four models (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Model 1, shown in 
Table 4.2, tests the direct effects of the appropriability conditions on external commercialization 
using MLE in the form of a zero inflated negative binomial method (Tang, et al., 2012). Models 
2 through 4 test the remaining relationships using OLS regression and results are shown in Table 
4.3. Model 2 tests the direct effect of the appropriability conditions on firm performance. Model 
3 tests the direct effect of external commercialization on firm performance. Model 4 tests the 
mediation effect of external commercialization on the relationship between appropriability 
conditions and firm performance.  
Model 1. The first step in demonstrating support for the hypothesized mediation model is 
to establish a direct relationship between the appropriability conditions - complementary assets, 
dynamism, complexity and appropriability regime – and the mediator, external 
commercialization (Baron & Kenny, 1986). External commercialization is a count variable with 
nearly 20% (318) of cases having at least one external commercialization agreement and 80% 
(1300) of cases having no external commercialization agreements. Therefore a Zero Inflated 
Negative Binomial (ZINB) regression model is applied. Results of the Vuong test confirm that 
the ZINB is a better fit than the NB model (z=5.81; p<.001). Likewise the alpha test confirms 
that NB is a better model fit than a Poisson regression (χ2=126.23; p<.001).  
I applied a hierarchical approach by first entering the controls in the constrained model 
(Model 1) and then adding the independent variables in the full model (Model 2). Model 3 
facilitates interpretation of the coefficients from the full model as incident rate ratio (odds ratios). 
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The results shown in Table 4.2 indicate that the overall model is significant (likelihood ratio χ2 
= 482.14; p <.001). Yet comparison of the fit indices suggests that the control model (1) is a 
better fit to the data than the full model (2). The differences for the Likelihood Ratio (6.49), 
McFadden’s R2 (-.06) and BIC (67.39) all indicate support in favor of the control model over the 
full model. This suggests that the incremental explanatory power of the full model was 
insufficient to accommodate the loss in degrees of freedom from the addition of five predictors 
into the model. To facilitate interpretation of the results the coefficient of each predictor was 
transformed to an incident rate ratio (odds ratio). The incident rate ratio (irr) represents how 
changes in the appropriability condition affect the rate at which external commercialization 
occurs (ceteris paribus). The percent increase or decrease can be calculated as 1 – irr. Values 
greater than 1 represent an increase in the likelihood of occurrence and values less than 1 
represent a decrease. The results provided no support for the proposed relationships between the 
appropriability conditions and external commercialization. None of the coefficients were 
significant and the odds ratios are observed to be near 1.00, meaning that a change in the level of 
the predictor is likely to have no impact on external commercialization activity.3 Contrary to 
expectations, the consistent lack of significance suggests that appropriability conditions are not 
good predictors of external commercialization activity. Therefore the mediation requirement for 
a direct relationship between the predictors and the mediator is not fulfilled. The remaining 
relationships are tested in Models 2–4. 
Model 2. The second requirement for support of the mediation hypotheses is to show a 
significant relationship between appropriability conditions and the dependent variable, firm 
performance (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Results are shown in Table 4.3, Model 2. Controls were 
                                                 
3
 One exception to is the irr for volatility z = 1.35 (ns), se = 20.29.  
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Table 4.1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Return on Assets -.08 .30  
2 Industry 20 .05 .21 .09**          
3 Industry 23 .02 .15 .03 -.03 
4 Industry 26 .03 .16 .06*  -.04 -.02 
5 Industry 28 .22 .42 -.18** -.12** -.82** -.09** 
6 Industry 30 .03 .16 .02 -.04 -.02 -.03 -.09** 
7 Industry 34 .02 .15 .04 -.04 -.02 -.03 -.09** -.03 
8 Industry 35 .17 .38 -.01 -.10** -.70** -.08** -.25** -.07** -.07** 
9 Industry 36 .22 .41 .06* -.12** -.81** -.09** -.29** -.09** -.08** -.24** 
10 Industry 37 .05 .22 .07** -.05* -.04 -.04 -.12** -.04 -.04 -.11** -.12** 
11 Industry 38 .17 .38 -.03 -.10** -.69** -.07** -.24** -.07** -.07** -.21** -.24** -.11** 
12 R & D  .66 3.48 -.31** -.04 -.03 -.03 .24** -.02 -.03 -.07** -.06** -.04 
13 Patent Count 316.94 1650.37 .08** -.04 -.03 -.01 -.03 -.02 -.02 .04 .08** .02 
14 Munificence .05 .03 .05* -.07** -.68** -.11** -.21** .18** .02 -.14** -.02 .09** 
15 Prior ROA -.09 .39 .53** .06** .59* .06* -.18** .01 .04 .07** .02 .05* 
16 Firm Size 7.50 26.71 .12** .11** -.01 .04 -.02 -.01 -.02 -.03 -.02 .17** 
17 Firm Age 27.92 30.49 .27** .14** .03 .10** -.05* .06* .08** -.02 -.07** .08** 
18 Alliances 1.63 5.84 .05* -.04 -.02 -.03 .05 -.03 -.04 .06* .05* -.03 
19 Complement. Assets 3.86 2.80 .20** .07** .11** .11** .00 .07** .07** -.07** -.08** .12** 
20 Regime 119.97 20.09 -.21** .19** .01 .07** .53** -.06* .05 -.34** -.40** -.23** 
21 Volatility .01 .01 .08** -.10** .01 .38** -.04 .24** .04 -.19** .08** -.10** 
22 Tech. Change .43 2.16 -.01 .03 -.10** -.07** -.37** -.02 -.04 .73** .07** -.08** 
23 Complexity 20.58 9.66 -.18** -.22** -.04 .02 .37** -.21** -.29** -.01 -.30** .58** 
24 External Comm. .45 1.54 -.01 -.05* -.04 -.03 .13** -.03 -.04 -.03 .04 -.04 
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 Table 4.1 Continued 
 Variables 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1 Return on Assets              
2 Industry 20              
3 Industry 23  
4 Industry 26  
5 Industry 28  
6 Industry 30  
7 Industry 34  
8 Industry 35  
9 Industry 36  
10 Industry 37  
11 Industry 38  
12 R & D  -.03 
13 Patent Count -.04 -.03 
14 Munificence .35** -.04 .00 
15 Prior ROA -.05 -.23** .06* .04 
16 Firm Size -.09** -.05* .50** -.01 .09** 
17 Firm Age -.10** -.11** .20** .01 .20** .35** 
18 Alliances -.06* -.01 .66** .00 .04 .36** .10** 
19 Complement. Assets -.11** -.06* .27** -.02 .14** .33** .38** .19** 
20 Regime .24** .20** -.08** -.04 -.21** -.06* -.12** .00 -.06*     
21 Volatility -.13** .00 -.01 .09** .04 .02 .09** -.05* .08** -.06* 
22 Tech. Change -.24** -.11** .09** -.10** .08** .00 -.08** .12** -.08** -.33** -.12** 
23 Complexity -.02 .17** .01 -.05* -.14** .05* -.17** .07** -.05 .28** -.14** .03 
24 External Comm. -.05 .04 .48** -.01 -.02 .22** .05* .64** .13** -.06* -.04 .01 .09** 
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entered first, followed by the independent variables. A small but significant change in Adjusted 
R2 was observed when the independent variables were added to the model (∆R2 = .01; p <.001). 
Hypothesis 1a suggested a positive relationship between complementary assets and firm 
performance as a baseline for the mediation effect. This relationship was supported (β= .07; p < 
.01) as expected (Ceccagnoli, 2009). Hypothesis 2a suggested a positive relationship between the 
appropriability regime and firm performance. However, in contrast to prior literature this 
relationship (β= .06; ns) was not significant (Ceccagnoli, 2009). Finally the relationship 
between environmental factors and firm performance were tested (Dess & Beard, 1984). 
Environmental dynamism was tested using measures for volatility and technological change. 
Volatility was significant (β= .06; p < .05), however technological change was not (β= -.06; 
ns). Likewise, environmental complexity was not significant (β= .07; ns).  
Model 3. The third condition for mediation is a direct effect of the mediator, external 
commercialization, on the dependent variable, firm performance (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
Results are shown in model 3, Table 4.3. This relationship was not significant (β= -.02; ns) 
providing no support for this component of the relationship. Unfortunately, this precludes 
support for the mediation model as proposed, regardless of partial support that may have been 
provided by the other tests. 
Model 4. Finally, the full model tests for the mediation effect of external 
commercialization (Model 4 Table 4.3). There was no observed change in the R2 or the estimates 
for the independent variables when compared to Model 2. Thus, Model 4 is not significant, 
reinforcing the lack of support evidenced in the previous models. 
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Table 4.2 Negative Binomial Regression Results 
 
Effects of Appropriability Conditions on  
External Commercialization (n=1618) 
Variable 
Model 1  
 
Controlsa 
Model 2 
 
Full Modela 
Model 3 
Incident 
Rate Ratio 
    
Controls 
  
 
 Industry controls were included (ns) 
  
 
 Technological knowledge 
  
 
R&D intensity -0.95 -0.91 0.98 
Patent count  1.38  1.04 1.00 
 Munificence -0.47 -0.53 0.29 
 Firm prior performance   1.77†  1.64† 1.34† 
 Firm size  -0.91 -1.10 1.00 
 Firm age  0.45  0.23 1.00 
 Alliances  5.80***  4.24*** 1.05*** 
    
Independent Variables 
   
 Complementary assets 
 
-0.18 0.99 
 Appropriability regime 
 
-0.90 0.99 
 Environmental dynamism  
   
Volatility 
 
 0.02 1.35 
Rate of technological change 
 
 1.39 1.09 
 Environmental complexity  
 
 0.04 1.00 
    
-2 Log Likelihood -1041.74 -1038.49 
 
Likelihood ratio χ2  475.63***  482.14*** 
 
Δ Likelihood ratio χ2 
 
 6.49 
 
McFadden’s Adjusted R2   .165   .159 
 
BIC -9672.33 -9604.94  
Δ BIC 
 
 67.39  
a
 Standardized z scores 
† p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Table 4.3 OLS Regression Results 
 
The Influence of Appropriability Conditions and External Commercialization 
on Firm Performance 
 
Dependent Variable ROA Lagged 4 years (n=1618) 
Variable 
 
 
Controls 
Model 2 
Direct 
Effects 
Model 3 
Mediator 
Effects 
Model 4a 
 
Full Model 
     
Controls 
  
 
 
 Industry controls were included 
  
 
 
 Technological knowledge 
  
 
 
R&D intensity -.18*** -.18*** -.18*** -.18*** 
Patent count  .00  - .02   .00  -.01 
 Munificence  .01  .00  .01  .00 
 Firm prior performance   .44***  .43***  .44***  .43*** 
 Firm size   .00  -.01  .00 -.01 
 Firm age  .15***  .11***  .15***  .11*** 
 Alliances  .03  .05  .03  .06 
     
Independent Variables 
    
 Complementary assets 
 
 .07** 
 
 .07** 
 Appropriability regime 
 
-.06 
 
-.06 
 Environmental dynamism  
    
Volatility 
 
 .06* 
 
 .06* 
Rate of technological change 
 
-.06 
 
-.06 
 Environmental complexity  
 
-.07 
 
-.07 
     
Mediating Variable  
 
 
 
 External Commercialization (EC) 
  
-.02 -.02 
     
Adjsuted-R2  .34  .35  .34  .35 
∆ Adjusted R2 
 
 .01***  0.00  0 .00 
F-Stat 50.49*** 41.24*** 47.70*** 39.46*** 
ΔF-Stat 
 
 6.71***  .62  .57 
     
a. Model 4 is in comparison to model 2 
 
 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Post-hoc Tests 
In view of the lack of support for the expected relationships, several post-hoc tests were 
conducted.  First, I ran the regression model using the Preacher and Hayes (2004) recommended 
bootstrapping approach to mediation.  Results were similar to the Baron and Kenney approach. 
Tests for indirect effects were not significant.  The test (homogeneity of interaction) for a 
mediation effect across different levels of the independent variables were also not significant.   
Constrained samples. In one set of tests I used constrained samples to test the 
robustness of the results. The first subsample was a matched sample of 636 firms with equal 
representation of those that had engaged in external commercialization and those that had not 
(318 firms in each group). The purpose was to test whether the excessive number of firms with 
zero external commercialization agreements was driving the results. The same method as above 
was applied to this sample with the exception that the negative binomial regression did not 
include the extension for zero inflation. Echoing the initial results, the fit indices favored the 
control model over the full model (∆-2LL=6.42; ∆χ2=12.84; ∆McFadden’s R2=0.0; and 
∆BIC=19.44) and there were no significant effects for the influence of appropriability conditions 
on external commercialization. The remaining tests were conducted as before. There was 
evidence of a negative relationship between the rate of technological change and firm 
performance (β= -.14;p <.05). However there was no support for external commercialization as 
a mediator in the full model (∆R2=0; ns).  
Another subsample of 1362 firms that excluded 256 firms in the pharmaceutical industry 
(SIC 283) was also tested. The pharmaceutical industry is unique in the high patent rate and 
presence of contract research organizations that perform the research and development function 
and then commercialize externally through large pharmaceutical companies. Results of the ZINB 
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regression show the control model is a better fit to the data than the full model (∆-2LL=7.24; ∆
χ2=14.85; ∆McFadden’s R2=0.1; and ∆BIC=57.4).  The direct relationships between the 
appropriability conditions and firm performance were similar to the full sample in that 
complementary assets (β= .08; p < .01) and volatility (β= .09; p < .01) exhibited positive 
relationships with firm performance. However, unlike the initial model technological change (β
= .48 p < .05) and complexity (β= -.90; p < .01) were also significant. The appropriability 
regime effects remained insignificant as did the mediating effect of external commercialization 
(∆R2=0; ns).  
Finally, a subsample containing only 318 firms that had engaged in external 
commercialization was tested to discover the effect of the frequency of external 
commercialization activity among those firms that had used this strategy. The main effect of the 
appropriability conditions on external commercialization was tested using a standard Negative 
Binomial regression. The fit indices (∆-2LL=3.56; ∆χ2=7.13; ∆McFadden’s R2=0.0; and 
∆BIC=21.68) expressed persistent preferences for the control model over the full model. 
Examination of the full model did show a significant relationship for the effect of 
complementary assets on external commercialization (β = 2.20, irr = 1.04; p < .05). The 
remaining mediation relationships were tested using OLS as above. The full model had an 
Adjusted R2 of .45 (∆R2=0; ns). There were no significant effects of the appropriability 
conditions or external commercialization (β =.01; ns) on firm performance.  
External commercialization as a binary variable.  An additional post-hoc test was 
conducted to check whether the measurement of external commercialization influenced the 
results. This time the variable was operationalized as a dichotomous variable with 1 representing 
firms that had engaged in external commercialization and 0 for those that had not. Results of the 
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binomial logit regression were significant for the effect of complementary assets (odds ratio .92; 
p<.05) and environmental complexity (odds ratio 1.04; p<.01) on external commercialization. 
However fit indices continued to show the control model a better fit to the data. Consistent with 
the results of the hypothesized model, tests for mediation show that complementary assets (β= 
.06; p < .01) and volatility (β= .06; p < .05) have a direct effect on firm performance. However, 
there was no support for a mediation effect. 
Tests of influence.  A robustness test was conducted to check whether the (32) outliers 
previously omitted from the analysis would influence the results.  The models were analyzed 
with 1650 observations.  However the zero inflated negative binomial model failed to converge 
using the full data set.  Visual examination of the leverage versus residual squared plot showed 
seven observations that appeared to be truly problematic and these were deleted.   The models 
were run again using the remaining 1643 observations.  The indicators of model fit were similar 
to the original results, as were the significance and magnitude of the regression coefficients.  
Thus, although the original omission of outliers may have been aggressive in eliminating points 
of influence, this did not affect the results 
Exclusion of industry controls and alternatively specified inflator.   I also had 
concerns that the industry controls may have attenuated the overall results for the model because 
industry factors were accounted for in the independent variables. Specifically appropriability 
regime, environmental dynamism and environmental complexity were measured at the industry 
level.  Thus, an alternative model excluding industry controls was tested in a post-hoc analysis.  
 In this model I also altered the model for the zero inflated negative binomial regression.  
In this model an additional variable was introduced specifically to predict the excess zero’s in the 
data.  According to Long and Freese (2006) the variable specified for the inflate portion of the 
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equation should be specifically targeted at predicting excess zeros and may not necessarily be 
one of the variables in the model being tested.  Thus, I specified External Commercialization 
Intensity in the inflate component of the ZINB equation.  External Commercialization Intensity 
is a measure of the percentage of firm revenue received from licensing, aggregated at the 
industry level.  The data are sourced from the 2002 Census. Because a census measure offers a 
better representation of the true magnitude of activity compared to other data sources, it is ideal 
for predicting excess zeros due to underreporting compared to real zeros due to a firm’s 
inactivity in external commercialization.  The ZINB estimation equation for the full model in 
STATA is: 
DV = Controls (excluding industry dummies) IVs, inflate (EC intensity) 
Consistent with prior results, the post-hoc tests for the direct effects of the independent 
variables on the mediator shown in Table 4.4 indicates the control model is a better fit for the 
data than the full model (∆-2LL= 11.01; ∆χ2= 22.02; ∆McFadden’s R2=-.01; and ∆BIC=14.93).  
However, in an improvement from the original model, the variables for complementary assets 
(β= -1.73; p < .10), appropriability regime (β= 2.62; p < .01), and environmental complexity (β= 
1.67; p < .10) were significant.  Likewise, the results of the OLS regression shown in Table 4.5 
failed to support a mediation effect.   However improvements in the significance of the 
independent variables were observed for complementary assets (β= .06; p < .01), appropriability 
regime (β= -.08; p < .001) and rate of technological change (β= -.08; p < .001).  
Alternative Model Specification: Moderation 
Although the tests of the proposed model produced no support for the original 
hypotheses, further investigation revealed interactions between appropriability conditions and 
firm performance. Moderating relationships were tested using OLS regression in Models 1-3
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Table 4.4 Post-hoc Industry Controls Excluded  
Negative Binomial Regression Results - EC Intensity Predictor 
Effects of Appropriability Conditions on 
External Commercialization (n=1618) 
Variable 
Model 1  
 
Controlsa 
Model 2 
 
Full Modela 
Model 3 
Incident  
Rate Ratio 
    
Controls    
    
   Technological knowledge    
R&D intensity   1.71† 1.47 1.02 
Patent count   -.05 .51 1.0 
   Munificence     .02 .09 1.19 
   Firm prior performance  -2.72 ** -1.73† .80 
   Firm size     .81 .92 1.0 
   Firm age 
-1.74† -1.02 1.0 
  Alliances  5.27*** 4.91*** 1.13 
    
Independent Variables    
   Complementary Assets   -1.73† .95 
   Appropriability regime  2.62 ** 1.01 
   Environmental dynamism       
Volatility  1.1  
Rate of technological change  -.93 .97 
   Environmental complexity   1.67† 1.01 
    
-2 Log Likelihood -1128.88 -1139.89  
Likelihood ratio χ2    301.36***    279.34***  
∆ Likelihood ratio χ2       22.02  
McFadden’s Adjusted R2           .105          .101  
BIC -9579.33 -9594.26  
∆ BIC       14.93  
a
 Standardized z scores 
† p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4.5 Post-hoc Industry Controls Excluded  
OLS Regression Results 
The Influence of Appropriability Conditions and External Commercialization 
on Firm Performance 
 
Dependent Variable ROA Lagged 4 years (n=1618) 
Variable 
 
 
Controls 
Model 2 
Direct 
Effects 
Model 3 
Mediator 
Effects 
Model 4a 
 
Full Model 
     
Controls     
     
   Technological knowledge     
R&D intensity -.19*** -.18*** -.19*** -.18*** 
Patent count 0.0 -.02 0.0 -.01 
   Munificence   .03  .01  .03  .01 
   Firm prior performance    .45***   .43***  .45***  .43*** 
   Firm size    .01 0.0  .01 0.0 
   Firm age   .16***   .12***  .16***  .12*** 
   Alliances   .03   .04  .025  .05 
     
Independent Variables     
      Complementary Assets   .06**    .06** 
   Appropriability regime  -.08***  -0.0*** 
   Environmental dynamism        
Volatility    .03   .03 
Rate of technological change  -.08***  -.08*** 
   Environmental complexity   -.04†  -.04† 
     
Mediating Variable     
   External Commercialization (EC)    .03  .03 
     
Adjsuted-R2       .34     .36       .34     .36 
∆ Adjusted R2      .02***       .001†    0.0 
F-Stat 118.71*** 74.27*** 103.22*** 68.26*** 
∆F-Stat    8.3***     2.91†     .87 
 
    
a. Model 4 is in comparison to model 2    
† p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001    
76 
 
shown in Table 4.6. The controls are entered in Model 1, followed by the direct effects in Model 
2 and the interaction effects in model 3. There is a significant change in R2 from Model 2 
(R2=.35) to Model 3 (R2=.36). Model 3 also shows significant interaction effects for the rate of 
technological change (β= .07; p < .01), environmental complexity (β= -.08; p < .05) and the 
appropriability regime (β= .10; p < .01). However there was not a significant interaction effect 
for complementary assets (β= -.03; ns) or volatility (β= -.03; ns). 
To better interpret the moderation effects, the significant interactions were plotted in 
Figures 4.1- 4.3 (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Figure 4.1 illustrates that at high levels of external 
commercialization high rates of technological change are associated with moderate increases in 
ROA. Conversely, at low levels of external commercialization higher rates of technological 
change decreases ROA. Thus, external commercialization reduces the otherwise negative effect 
of the rate of technological change on ROA.  The moderation effect of external 
commercialization on environmental complexity is shown in Figure 4.2. Here we observe that 
high external commercialization strengthens the negative relationship between environmental 
complexity and ROA. However, when external commercialization is low environmental 
complexity has limited effect on ROA. Finally, Figure 4.3 shows that at high levels of external 
commercialization, high appropriability regimes are associated with increases in ROA. 
Conversely, at low levels of external commercialization high appropriability regimes are 
associated with decreasing ROA. Further discussion of these interactions is reserved for the next 
chapter  This chapter reported the results of the hypothesis tests and several post-hoc tests. 
Alternative model specifications were also tested. These results are discussed in the next chapter. 
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Table 4.6 Alternative Model Specification 
 
Moderating Effects of External Commercialization 
on Firm Performance 
 
Dependent Variable ROA Lagged 4 years (n=1618) 
Variable Model 1  Controls 
Model 2 
Direct Effects 
Model 3 
Interactions  
Controls 
  
 
 Industry controls were included 
  
 
 Technological knowledge 
  
 
R&D intensity -.18*** -.18*** 
 
Patent count  .00  - .02  
 
 Munificence  .01  .00 
 
 Firm prior performance   .44***  .43*** 
 
 Firm size   .00  -.01 
 
 Firm age  .15***  .11*** 
 
 Alliances  .03  .05 
 
    
Independent Variables 
   
 Complementary assets 
 
 .07** 
 
 Environmental dynamism  
   
Volatility 
 
 .06* 
 
Rate of technological change 
 
-.06 
 
 Environmental complexity  
 
-.07 
 
 Appropriability regime 
 
-.06 
 
    
Moderating Variable 
  
 
 External Commercialization (EC) 
 
-.02  
    
Interactions 
  
 
EC x Complementary assets 
  
-.03 
EC x Appropriability regime 
  
 .10** 
EC x Volatility 
  
-.03 
EC x Rate of technological change 
  
 .07** 
EC x Environmental complexity 
  
-.08* 
    
Adjsuted-R2  .34  .35  .36 
∆ Adjusted R2 
 
 .01***  .01*** 
F-Stat 50.49*** 39.46*** 32.97*** 
ΔF-Stat 
 
 7.29***  2.34* 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This Chapter provides a discussion of the study findings in four sections. In the first 
section I provide an overview of the study and discuss the overall findings.  Specific results for 
each hypothesis and insights from additional findings are also discussed. Next, I take stock of the 
theoretical, empirical and practical contributions of the study. Finally, I address limitations and 
suggest directions for future research.  
Overview 
Innovation has been identified as a source of competitive advantage (Hamel, 2000). 
Indeed investment in innovation has grown on a worldwide basis (NSF, 2010). Yet, firms are 
challenged to earn a return on this investment in innovation (Teece, 1986; Thomas & D'Aveni, 
2009).  External commercialization may be one strategy firms can employ to increase the value 
appropriated from their investment innovation.   Prior literature has provided logic for external 
commercialization and evidence of the factors that lead a firm to engage in external 
commercialization (Arora & Gambardella, 2010a; Chesbrough, 2003).  However the literature is 
lacking in a strategic theoretical grounding as well as evidence linking external 
commercialization to firm performance. 
Understanding whether, and under what conditions, external commercialization has 
performance advantages is a needed extension of the current literature (Walter, 2012). It is also 
vital to understand the performance consequences of an external commercialization strategy in 
providing guidance to managers seeking returns on their investment in innovation. Further, a 
strategic theoretical approach is needed to position external commercialization firmly within the 
strategy literature.  Two research questions emerged from this need. 
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1. What conditions influence the extent to which a firm engages in external 
commercialization?  
2. Does external commercialization influence firm performance?  
I applied the theoretical lens of real options theory to investigate the drivers and 
performance consequences of external commercialization. The firm’s initial investment in 
technological knowledge has been positioned in the literature as an irreversible investment that 
provides the firm with an option to commercialize the innovation in the future (McGrath, 1997, 
Miller, 2002). The option is valuable because it provides managerial flexibility to hold, abandon 
or exercise an option in uncertain environments (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999; Dixit & Pindyck, 
1994).  
To further develop the theoretical model, I integrated the constructs of the appropriability 
framework (Teece, 1986) with real options theory. More specifically, the model proposes that the 
appropriability conditions of complementary assets (irreversible investment), appropriability 
regime and market timing (uncertainty) will influence the external commercialization decision 
(managerial flexibility). Accordingly, managers are expected to select a commercialization 
strategy that enhances the level of appropriation and firm performance. Thus, external 
commercialization mediates the relationship between appropriability conditions and firm 
performance. Hypotheses were derived from this model and tested in a large scale empirical 
design.  
Discussion of Research Findings 
As a whole, the results reported in Chapter 4 do not provide support for the hypotheses. 
The first part of this discussion takes holistic perspective, examining the lack of findings overall. 
This is followed by a more detailed discussion of each hypothesis. Finally, the findings from the 
alternative model specification are explored.  
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Taken together, the results do not provide evidence of a real options approach to external 
commercialization of innovation. External commercialization is, in the main, a strategy of 
incremental returns (Grindley & Teece, 1997; Walter, 2012). It was proposed here as untapped 
potential for firms that were not well positioned to appropriate value from direct 
commercialization of their innovation. The returns were not expected to exceed those of direct 
commercialization under strong appropriability conditions (Teece, 1986; Rivette & Kline, 2000). 
Thus, providing evidence of significant relationships for what was posited as incremental returns 
was an inherent challenge in this research. 
At the same time I recognized that external commercialization is an underutilized 
strategy. Indeed, the motivation for the study was driven in part by the potential for managers to 
consider this strategy more often as a way to increase returns on the investment in innovation. 
The analytical method and the post-hoc tests provided some assurance that the large number of 
firms that had no external commercialization activity was not driving the results. However, I 
cannot rule out the influence that the low frequency of external commercialization among firms 
did use this strategy may have had on the results. The low utilization combined with marginal 
returns may have made it particularly difficult to detect a relationship with the return on assets 
performance measure (Combs, et al., 2005). A performance measure that is more proximate to 
external commercialization may be better suited to uncover the expected returns from this 
strategy (Walter, 2012). 
Finally, it is possible that the returns from external commercialization are in fact not 
appropriated by the focal firm to the extent proposed (Crook, Ketchen, Combs & Todd, 2008; 
Teece, 1986; Winter, 2006).  Indeed, the challenge of appropriating value from innovation was a 
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major motivation for this study. Having provided explanations for the overall results, I now turn 
to a discussion of each hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1a and b: complementary assets. In Hypothesis 1, I reasoned that firms 
faced with weak complementary asset positions were likely to use an external commercialization 
strategy to enhance performance.  Consistent with prior literature, the positive relationship 
between complementary assets and firm performance (H1a) was significant (Tripsas, 1997).  
However the results did not support the mediation effect of external commercialization. 
Complementary assets did not have an influence on external commercialization, nor did external 
commercialization influence firm performance (H1b).  
These results confirm the underlying premise that strong complementary asset positions 
have a positive influence on the firm’s ability to appropriate value from its own innovation 
(Teece, 1986). Yet the results suggest that external commercialization does not play a role in this 
relationship. One explanation may be that firm’s use other types of agreements to compensate for 
their lack of complementary assets (Ahuja, 2000; Stuart, 2000). For example, manufacturing or 
marketing agreements provide the firm with access to appropriation enhancing complementary 
assets but fall outside the definition of external commercialization (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). 
Although alliance agreements of all types were controlled for, it may be more appropriate to 
include them in the operational definition and measurement of complementary assets (Walter, 
2012). This could provide a sharper distinction between the levels of complementary assets 
available to the firm. 
Hypothesis 2a and b: appropriability regime. Consistent with real options reasoning, I 
hypothesized that firms operating in weak appropriability regimes could use an external 
commercialization strategy to appropriate some value from innovation (Vanhaverbeke et al., 
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2008).   The absence of a direct relationship between appropriability regime and firm 
performance was surprising (H2a), given that this has been established in prior literature 
(Ceccagnoli, 2009).  Neither did the evidence support a mediated relationship (H2b). The 
appropriability regime did not have a significant influence on external commercialization and 
external commercialization did not affect firm performance.  
One explanation for the overall lack of significance associated with the appropriability 
regime may lie in level of analysis used to measure this variable. The literature provides ample 
foundation to use an industry-level measure (Cohen et al., 2000) on the basis that appropriability 
regimes tend to be homogeneous within, and heterogeneous across, industries (Pisano & Teece, 
2007). Yet an industry level measure may not be fine-grained enough to detect differences in the 
individual firm’s ability to protect their intellectual property. A measure that includes firm-level 
indicators of protection such as patent lawsuits or patenting intensity relative to the industry may 
be more productive in testing this relationship. In addition, and contrary to the hypothesized 
relationship, some studies have found that firms in tighter appropriability regimes are more likely 
to license technology precisely because they can protect it (Ceccagnoli, 2009; Fosfuri, 2006). It 
is possible that the results are confounded by these offsetting effects.  
Hypothesis 3: environmental dynamism. I hypothesized that external 
commercialization would increase with the level of environmental dynamism (Chen et al., 2010; 
Rosenkopf & Schilling, 2007). Two dimensions of environmental dynamism were considered in 
the model - volatility and the rate of technological change in the industry.  The results for 
Hypothesis 3 did not support a relationship with external commercialization for either 
dimension.  
84 
 
Hypothesis 4: environmental complexity. I hypothesized that more complex 
environments would lead to more external commercialization (Ahuja, 2000; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996).  However, the relationship was not supported.  One explanation for this 
may be that differences in the level of environmental complexity do not result so much in more 
or less frequency of external commercialization, but different patterns of agreements (Rosenkopf 
& Schilling, 2007). Likewise, different patterns of agreements, for example between industry 
leaders and smaller firms versus equally balanced competitors, are expected to have varying 
returns to the focal firm due to bargaining power (Porter, 1980).  
In addition, the literature upon which Hypothesis 4 was developed applied to the 
frequency of all types of inter-firm agreements (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2002, Stuart, 2000). 
Although extrapolation of the literature to external commercialization agreements is a logical 
step, certainly these are a small portion of the total number of inter-firm agreements captured by 
these studies. Idiosyncrasies or boundary conditions may apply to external commercialization 
agreements that do not apply in the more general case of inter-firm agreements (Walter, 2012), 
contributing to the lack of findings for Hypothesis 4.  
Insights from Additional Findings 
Given the absence of the expected relationships between the constructs of interest I 
formulated a post-hoc investigation of an alternatively specified model. This model posited a 
moderated, rather than a mediated, relationship between external commercialization and the 
variables previously tested. The results produced significant interactions for appropriability 
regime, rate of technological change (dynamism) and environmental complexity, with external 
commercialization. This suggests that the alternatively specified model of moderation may be a 
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more appropriate representation of the relationships than the originally proposed mediation 
model.  
In the alternative model, external commercialization moderated the influence of the 
appropriability regime on firm performance. Specifically, higher levels of external 
commercialization in tight appropriability regimes were associated with increases in performance 
(Figure 4.3). Although this interaction effect was not hypothesized, it is consistent with prior 
literature that shows a positive relationship between the strength of the appropriability regime 
and the propensity to license (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; Cohen et al., 2000).   
The alternative specification for moderation also produced a significant interaction of 
technological change with external commercialization. Specifically low levels of external 
commercialization in environments with high rates of technological change were associated with 
a decreasing return on assets, while higher levels of external commercialization had little effect 
on performance across high and low rates of technological change (Figure 4.1). This is consistent 
with the original logic presented in the hypotheses, that environments of rapid technological 
change provide opportunities for firms to introduce new technologies and garner momentum for 
adoption of these technologies (Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Utterback & Abernathy, 1975). 
However the asymmetric pattern of returns in the interaction suggest that the opportunity cost of 
not putting the technology into the fray may be greater than the incremental return appropriated 
from external commercialization (Grindley & Teece, 1997 Pisano & Teece, 2007; Winter, 2006). 
Indeed firms that do not leverage market timing are likely to find their technologies left behind 
(McGrath, 1997). 
The interaction of environmental complexity with external commercialization was also 
significant in the alternative model. The results show that high external commercialization in 
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high complexity environments is associated with decreasing ROA, while low levels of external 
commercialization have little effect on ROA (Figure 4.2). One explanation for this finding is that 
the risk of imitation is greater in complex environments with relatively more balanced 
competitors vying for technological dominance (McGrath, 1997). Thus external 
commercialization appears to be risky when the potential benefits of technology diffusion are 
offset by the loss of appropriation to other industry participants (Alexy & Reitzig, 2012; Coff & 
Laverty, 2001: Lavie, 2006). 
The results of the post-hoc specification with the industry controls excluded are also 
worth noting.   Industry controls were included in the primary study because of the possibility 
that unobserved heterogeneity at the industry level could influence the results.  However, 
because the industry level variables relevant to the study are included as predictors in the model I 
also had to consider the likelihood that the controls were attenuating the effects of the predictors. 
The removal of the industry controls did not change the results for the overall models or the 
mediation effect.  The Adjusted R2 (.36) was the same in both models. However, there was a 
change in the level of significance for the industry-level predictors. Appropriability regime 
changed from β= -.06; ns to β= -.08; p < .001.  Rate of technological change also shifted from β= 
-.06; ns to β= -.08; p < .001 and environmental complexity was marginally significant (β= -.04).  
These results suggest that the more parsimonious model without industry controls effectively 
explains the outcomes with minimal risk of under-specification. 
Contributions 
Notwithstanding the lack of empirical results in this dissertation, some contributions have 
been made.  These contributions lie in the theoretical extensions and intersections of the current 
literature.  Real options theory has been previously applied to innovation strategy           
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(McGrath, 1997), and as a financial model for funding research and development (Amram & 
Kulatilaka, 1999).  However, real options theory has not been previously applied to open 
innovation or the external commercialization decision.  Scholars of open innovation such as 
Chesbrough (2003) have suggested that real options may have potential to provide the theoretical 
grounding needed in the open innovation and external commercialization literature.  Reflecting 
on the theoretical grounding for external commercialization, Arora & Gambardella (2010a) 
observed that the antecedents of licensing activity are often based on the appropriability 
framework, but lack a richer theoretical foundation.  They highlighted the need for a more 
strategic theoretical explanation for licensing activity, beyond the current economic view of the 
boundaries of the firm.  This dissertation provides this strategic lens through the application of 
real options theory. In sum, the application of real options theory at the intersection of the 
appropriability framework and external commercialization provides a unique contribution to the 
literature. 
From an empirical perspective I set out to make a contribution by testing a set of 
hypotheses which span the motivations and performance consequences of external 
commercialization. The lack of empirical support found in this study means that this contribution 
cannot be made as originally proposed. However progress has been made. The lack of support 
for the hypothesized relationships may imply that boundary conditions act in a contingent 
manner as suggested by the post-hoc results for the moderation model.  Indeed, these boundary 
conditions may also be more finite than could be detected in this high level study. This is 
productive in pointing to future research that examines external commercialization at a more 
detailed level.   
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Similarly, provision of practical guidance to managers is also precluded by the lack of 
empirical support found in this study.  Yet, this is also instructive. It is likely that external 
commercialization is advisable only under specific conditions.  As suggested in the preceding 
paragraph, a finely grained study aimed at detecting tighter boundary conditions may provide 
more specific insights needed to provide recommendations for managers.  This future research is 
discussed in the following section. 
Limitations  
Notwithstanding the methodological rigor applied in this study, some limitations remain.  
Alliance data, including agreements that fit the definition of external commercialization, are 
subject to under-reporting (Schilling, 2009). Although the data includes a broad scope of primary 
sources, there are no regulatory requirements for reporting these contractual relationships. 
Therefore the data probably represents a sample rather than a population of agreements. 
However, Schilling (2009) reported consistent results across different datasets which provided 
some confidence that the data is representative. 
In addition, return on assets is just one measure of firm performance that may not fully 
reflect the value appropriated from a firm’s innovation activity (Crook et al., 2008). One study 
has measured the returns from external commercialization using abnormal stock returns (Walter, 
2012) and performance measurement using alternative measures such as Tobin’s Q, market share 
or return on sales may also be fruitful (Combs et al., 2005). A finer-grained analysis of the 
innovation value appropriated by the firm and by other participants conducted at the product-
market level may be necessary to understand the full gamut of appropriation from innovation 
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Lavie, 2006). 
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Finally, in applying real options theory and the appropriability framework to external 
commercialization I did not address individual-level behavioral factors that may influence the 
technology commercialization decision. Indeed some of the debate surrounding real options 
theory highlights these very issues (Adner & Levinthal, 2004a; Barnett, 2008; McGrath et al., 
2004). Option traps are one manifestation of how managerial behavior influences the 
commercialization decision (Adner & Levinthal, 2004a). Option traps contribute to managerial 
reluctance to abandon investments as well as reluctance to exercise options. Option traps are 
driven in part by the psychological tendency to escalate commitment (Brockner, 1992; Staw, 
1981). The escalation of commitment is one example of a behavioral factor that was not included 
in this study and may have contributed to the lack of findings. 
Future Research 
Some of the findings from this study, albeit limited, do provide direction for future 
research.  First, the specification for a moderated relationship did indicate an interaction between 
external commercialization and the effect of appropriability conditions on firm performance.  
This specification should be pursued and could be augmented by a sharpening of measures as 
discussed previously in this Chapter. 
The findings also point to a strong relationship between external commercialization and 
other types of alliances.  External commercialization is only one type of inter-firm agreement. 
The decision to commercialize a technology externally is not likely to be made in isolation, but 
rather in the context of a broader innovation strategy as well as other types of inter-firm 
agreements (Ahuja, 2000; George, Zahra, Wheatley & Khan, 2001).  I envision two paths for 
potential investigation, both of which would leverage a real options approach. 
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First, external commercialization could be viewed as an initial investment in a 
relationship that provides the focal firm with an option to increase the level of commitment to the 
relationship in the future.  Licensing may be a means to enter a simple arms length contractual 
relationship that enables the focal firm to gain experience with the partner and reduce the 
uncertainty associated with entering a more extensive relationship such as research and 
development alliances or joint ventures. If a time series analysis revealed that external 
commercialization occurs early in a sequence of relationships between the same firms, this may 
provide evidence that firms use licensing as a nested option to establish relationships with other 
firms.           
A second study could examine external commercialization in the context of a larger 
innovation strategy.  Indeed firms that employ open innovation strategies may develop 
innovations internally or source them externally, as well as commercialize these innovations 
internally or externally.  Previous research has examined the complementarity of external 
knowledge sourcing and internal research and development in the context of absorptive capacity 
(Rothaermel & Alexandre, 2009).4  Similarly, investigation of the complementarity between 
external commercialization and the other innovation strategies is also worthwhile. 
Opportunities to extend this study to include individual-level cognitive factors should 
also be pursued. For example, resistance to open innovation in general and external 
commercialization in particular, sometimes referred to as the not invented here and not sold here 
syndromes may be due to mangers cognitive inertia connected to a tradition of vertically 
integrated innovation strategies (Chesbrough, 2003). This may be an additional reason for 
                                                 
4
 Absorptive capacity and learning also provide an interesting context for investigation of external 
commercialization.  That is, can firms actually learn to do this well?  Lichtenthaler (2009) described this notion as 
desorptive capacity – a firms’ capability to transfer knowledge out, rather than transfer knowledge in. 
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underutilization of a potentially beneficial strategy.  Understanding causes and interventions 
related to cognitive inertia may facilitate effective implementation of open innovation strategies 
(Reger, Gustafson, Demarie & Mullane, 1994).  
Alternatively, external commercialization may be inhibited because managers simply do 
not recognize potential outlets for their technologies (Rivette & Kline, 2000). Managerial focus 
on developing and commercializing technologies internally may preclude recognition of external 
opportunities (Busenitz & Barney, 1997). If these opportunities are distant from the core 
technology or industry, managers may not perceive the opportunity as relevant to them (Haynie, 
Shepherd & McMullen 2009). Thus, future research could incorporate a cognitive approach by 
considering the moderating effect of opportunity recognition on external commercialization 
(Bingham, Eisenhardt & Furr, 2007). 
Finally, the institutional environment was not addressed in this study. The investment in 
technological knowledge is conducted in complex and ambiguous task environments and 
decisions are made by managers who are subject to bounded rationality (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Duncan, 1972). Faced with the decision to commercialize technology managers decisions are 
likely to be influenced by institutional pressures and interpretive schemes that call for different 
types of investment decisions (Reus et al., 2009). Likewise, Barnett (2008) has proposed that 
formal and informal institutional structures are likely to shape managerial attentiveness and 
options decisions.  Accordingly, future research integrating an institutional and cognitive lens 
may be productive in providing an explanation of commercialization of technological 
knowledge.  
With regard to the methodological approach, I investigated external commercialization 
by analyzing quantitative archival data to test hypotheses. This approach is typical of maturing 
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streams of research, and is also likely to provide incremental contributions to the literature 
(Edmondson & McManus, 2007).  Moving the literature forward at this juncture may require a 
rigorous qualitative approach that taps a deeper understanding of contemporary innovation 
processes.  A multi-method qualitative study of a small sample of “serial licensors” could make 
such a contribution. A qualitative design could include unobtrusive thematic content analysis 
followed by semi-structured interviews with the managers responsible for innovation (Langley, 
1999).  This methodological approach has potential to uncover new propositions and constructs 
to move the literature forward in a meaningful way (Eisenhardt, 1999). 
Conclusion 
Theoretical contributions from this research were made by extending real options theory 
to the appropriability framework and external commercialization.  However, this study was 
unable to provide a conclusive response to the original research questions. There was an overall 
lack of empirical support for the hypothesized relationships between appropriability conditions, 
external commercialization and firm performance. One reason may be that the boundary 
conditions are more specific than were examined in this study.  The future research 
recommended here has potential to further drill down on these questions and extend the literature 
in new and exciting ways. 
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